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Rapid changes have characterized international relations since the end of the Cold 
War.  Transitioning democracies have been the scene of often-violent change, enduring 
civil war, political and economic struggle, and ethnic strife.  Transitioning nations 
increasingly need peacekeeping operations to maximize their chances for success.  
Historically however, peacekeeping operations created by the United Nations have been 
ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” and have not been conducive to establishing 
professional peacekeeping forces.  This thesis proposes that the more professional the 
peacekeeping operation, the higher the chance of success for the peacekeeping mission. 
The need for change to professional peacekeeping is particularly true for the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces.  The development of standing national forces designed and 
trained to act in crisis management and peacekeeping operations is critical for success. 
Using the Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) as a model, a 
separate brigade within the Ukrainian Armed Forces should be established to specifically 
and only perform peacekeeping missions.  Thus, this unit could be used as a springboard 
to begin the professionalization of peacekeeping not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe 
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Since the end of the Cold War, international relations have been characterized by 
hopes for peace and scourge of war.  Nationalism, ethnic tensions, and liberalizing 
economies have become the norm.  Democratizing countries have fallen into civil strife 
and war.  Peacekeeping operations are increasingly needed in these unlucky nations, 
which often require an external force to establish peace and stability due to political 
struggle, civil war and other social problems. 
This thesis argues that the general perception of modern peacekeeping should 
change from often unprofessional, poorly trained, and underpaid forces to elite, respected 
professionals. Since 1945, the United Nations has created ad hoc ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ to respond to peacekeeping needs as they arise.  This policy has not been 
conducive to establishing professional peacekeeping forces.  The need for change to 
professional peacekeeping is particularly true for the Ukrainian Armed Forces so they 
integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures.   
The future requires the development of standing national forces designed and 
trained to act in crisis management and peacekeeping operations.  These forces, designed 
from the onset to handle such situations, will improve the U.N.’s ability to carry out 
peacekeeping missions. 
Using the Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) as a model, a 
separate brigade within the Ukrainian Armed Forces should be established to specifically 
and only perform peacekeeping missions.  Thus, this unit could be used as a springboard 
to begin the professionalization of peacekeeping not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe 
and the rest of the world. 
This thesis proposes that the more professional the peacekeeping operation, the 
higher the chance of success for the peacekeeping mission.  Professionalism alone in the 
peacekeeping forces is obviously not the only factor for a successful mission, as one must 
take into account the willingness of the belligerents to participate in the process of 
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mitigation, the political situation, etc. in the affected region.  However, as will be 
considered in this thesis, the more professional the peacekeeping operation, the more 



























Today’s world is characterized by rapid changes in international relations.  With 
the end of the Cold War, a new era of instability and uncertainty has replaced the bipolar 
world.  Nationalism, ethnic tensions, and liberalizing economies have become the norm.  
This new era of instability, combined with the growth of interdependence and 
globalization, has increased the need for peacekeeping operations around the world.  
Peacekeeping operations are increasingly found in transitioning countries, which require 
an external force to establish peace and stability due to political struggle, civil war and 
other social problems.   
The current method of addressing situations requiring peacekeeping forces 
(PKFs) has proven inadequate in the emerging security environment since 1991.  
Furthermore, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. have certainly worsened 
international relations and the world’s attitude towards conducting peacekeeping 
operations.  Given the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, has the need 
for peacekeepers, not to mention professional peacekeepers, changed?  If anything, this 
study suggests the need has increased.  Based on this need for more professional 
peacekeeping in general, is it feasible to develop, possibly with foreign assistance, 
peacekeeping forces within the Ukrainian Armed Forces for regional and global 
peacekeeping operations?        
This study argues that the general perception of modern peacekeeping should 
change from often unprofessional, poorly trained, and underpaid forces to elite, respectful 
professionals who represent their respective countries with dignity.  The need for change 
is particularly true for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  The ability of the United Nations 
(U.N.) to play a wider and more effective role in world security affairs depends upon the 
willingness of the nations of the world to reconsider their intended use of the U.N. as a 
peacekeeping tool and upon U.N. willingness to consider basic reforms in its internal 
structure and procedures.  A definition of peacekeeping is presented by the former U.N. 
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali:  
1 
Peacekeeping, an invention of the United Nations was born of necessity. 
Because of the Cold War, the vision of collective security embodied in the 
charter of the United Nations never came to be. The gap was filled by the 
pragmatic device of peacekeeping, a concept that entailed the deployment 
of military forces not to prosecute a war, but to help bring about peace.  
The calming presence of United Nations peacekeepers, either unarmed 
observers or lightly armed forces, helped to contain numerous conflicts 
and created conditions for political talks to go forward.1 
Based on this definition, it is necessary to state the main principles of modern 
peacekeeping also given by Boutros Boutros-Ghali: 
First, it is important from the outset to integrate the short – to medium-
term “stabilizing actions” of the coalition force with the longer – term 
efforts of the United Nations to promote lasting reconciliation. In the 
context of internal conflicts, especially, lasting peace requires the 
institutionalization of effective channels through which parties can pursue 
their interests, so that they do not feel compelled to return to the 
battlefield. 
Second, consultation between the multinational force and the U.N. 
throughout the intervention is critical to ensure a smooth transition. 
Third, the transition to the United Nations operation should not occur until 
the conditions on the ground are conducive to a peacekeeping operation, 
where the consent and cooperation of the parties can be guaranteed. 
Fourth, the peacekeepers should be endowed with the mandate and 
resources to ensure that there is no “vacuum” in the immediate aftermath 
of an intervention. 
Finally, the primacy of the United Nations Security Council, which 
authorizes coalition forces as well as United Nations operations, is 
essential.2 
Historically, however, the U.N. has resorted to creating ad hoc ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ to respond to situations that require peacekeeping as they arise.  This has not 
been conducive to establishing and building professional peacekeeping forces within the 
                                                 
1Cited in Barbara Benton, editor, Soldiers for Peace, pp. 2-3. Facts on File, Inc., N.Y., N.Y., 1996. 
2 Ibid. pp. 3-4.  
2 
United Nations.  It must be mentioned that it is also the failure of collective security on a 
political level that has contributed to instability needing peacekeeping forces in the first 
place.  However, the focus of this thesis is the need to professionalize peacekeeping.  
The method of the ‘coalition of the willing’ has proven successful at times but has 
also exhibited a high percentage of failures.  These failures include some embarrassing 
situations: the involvement of peacekeepers in smuggling in Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia, 
failure of the peacekeeping mission in Mozambique, and the inability to implement 
successful peacekeeping in Somalia in 1993: 
ONUMOZ [United Nations Mission in Mozambique] was also not the 
model PKO. Many of the things that have gone wrong in other UN 
operations also went wrong in Mozambique. Timetables slipped, the local 
parties delayed compliance, budgets soared, parent UN agencies engaged 
in obstructionism, and UN resources on the ground were underutilized and 
worse. What did work was an unexpected mix of strong leadership, donor 
coordination, and aggressive diplomacy which provided the critical 
underpinning for continued forward movement throughout the process.3  
Other examples include: 
The failure of UN troops to prevent the genocide that claimed 800,000 
lives in Rwanda in 1994, and the massacre the following year of 7,000 
men and boys in the UN-declared safe haven of Srebrenica in Bosnia. 
The report [Kofi Annan’s report on March 7, 2000] said "the need for 
change has been rendered even more urgent by recent events in Sierra 
Leone," where more than 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage by the 
rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in May before being released in 
batches over the following weeks. The humiliation in Sierra Leone 
showed how far peacekeeping has moved from the traditional task of 
monitoring a ceasefire between regular armies with chains of command 
that responded to political instructions and pressure.4 
These problems in peacekeeping occurred not the least because of professionalism 
among the troops sent to the various missions.  Politics certainly played a major role in 
                                                 
3 Ambassador Dennis C. Jett, American Embassy, Maputo, Mozambique, Lessons Unlearned - Or 
Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere. 
http://www.jha.ac/Ref/aar008.htm. 
 
4 R. Holloway, UN Calls for Radical Peacekeeping Reforms that Would End Zero-Growth Budget.  
Agence France Presse, August 23, 2000. 
3 
the failure of these missions.  Nevertheless, this thesis focuses on the operational and 
tactical level where the structure of the peacekeeping forces can be changed to increase 
the likelihood of success.  Therefore, all responsible states, particularly those with a 
history of providing peacekeeping forces that failed in their missions, must rethink their 
attitude toward the implementation and reorganization of their PKFs.  Fortunately, much 
can be done to improve the U.N.’s ability to strengthen its contribution to international 
security.  
A more effective and arguably necessary step for meeting the increasing demand 
for PKFs is the development of standing national forces designed and trained to act in 
crisis management and peacekeeping operations (PKOs).  These forces, designed from 
the onset to handle such situations, will improve the U.N.’s ability to carry out PK 
missions when the need arises.5  
Due to the numerous failures of peacekeeping operations, as described in Chapter 
II, one of the solutions to solve these problems would be the creation of new regional 
peacekeeping forces at the national level.  It would be necessary to have the backing of a 
strong nation to initially support the PKOs with financial and logistic means.  
Consequently, there is a strong need for peacekeeping forces, structured as discussed in 
this thesis, to respond to any crisis in the world.  This thesis further deals with civil-
military relations aspects that might influence creation of professional peacekeeping 
forces as a part of Ukrainian Armed Forces.  Furthermore, the question arises whether or 
not Ukraine is capable of building the appropriate peacekeeping forces on the national 
level as an integral part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 
One possibility is the creation of a separate peacekeeping brigade within the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF).  This thesis examines in this idea in detail.  Although 
the entire UAF would not need to be reconfigured for peacekeeping, a need does exist for 
a separate, professional group of peacekeeping soldiers.  For example, the creation of a 
peacekeeping brigade would legitimize peacekeeping on an organizational level within 
the UAF and ensure that it would be given at least an equal status with the rest of the 
                                                 
5 A. Cowin, Expanded U.N. Peacekeeping: Costly and Risky with Few Rewards,  www.jinsa.com. 
4 
armed forces as well as serve as the backbone of civil-military relations in Ukraine, a 
newly democratic state. 
The reform process of the UAF must be framed socially and politically in 
accepted norms and practices.  This thesis will address the issue of domestic political 
concerns and will seek to answer the question of who is willing to support the idea of 
professionalization in the PKFs.  Furthermore, this thesis examines the structure of the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP)6 program and the issue of the allocation of national military 
resources.  Additionally, this thesis will emphasize the constituency of the Ukrainian 
government, society, and economy (in civil-military terms) for the reform of 
peacekeeping in general.   
Ukraine will be used as the case study for this thesis.  The case study provides 
critical analysis of the Ukraine’s current position and prospect for developing a 
competent PKF.  Ukraine is well positioned to successfully develop a PKF because it can 
draw on the unique experience gained from the existing Ukrainian-Polish Peacekeeping 
Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) and previous participation in peacekeeping operations.  
However, Ukraine also suffers from a fundamental impediment or the lack of 
professionalism in the PKOs affecting the UAF.  Ukraine is actively working to place 
itself on solid ground in the post-Cold War security environment, yet is so far financially 
unable to devote the necessary resources to develop professionalism in the military, 
especially in peacekeeping.  Therefore, this thesis argues that foreign assistance is one of 
the essential ingredients for transforming peacekeeping operations in the UAF into a 
professional, competent military structure.  While peacekeeping is only a part of the 
UAF, the UAF as a whole will also benefit from professionalization of their 
peacekeeping forces, further enabling the UAF to consistently generate effective 
peacekeeping troops.7   
Additionally, this thesis touches upon the current security environment and some 
of the failures and successes of the U.N.  As well as the opportunities for future remedies 
                                                 
6 The Pfp was created in 1994 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a means of 
normalizing relations between former adversaries in Europe-mainly the former Warsaw Pact nations and 
NATO countries. NATO Handbook, 1999, at www.nato.int. 
7 S. Zgurets, Ukrainian Trident, Polish Eagle, or on Military Parallels from the Life of Strategic 
Friends, on www.day.kiev.ua. 
5 
to successfully and consistently meet the demands of peacekeeping.  To emphasize, this 
thesis analyzes the previous and current Ukrainian experience in participating in the PfP 
program.  The overwhelming lack of professionalism, including corruption expressed in 
having positions based on personal connections rather than the level of competence, 
indicates a necessity for foreign assistance and oversight in some cases in order to 
cultivate a new atmosphere within the UAF and PK units particularly.   
Clearly, making the Ukraine’s peacekeeping forces professional is beneficial not 
only to the nation, but also on the global scale in terms of security and stability.  
Moreover, this thesis will prove that it is more cost-effective to increase a peacekeeper's 
standard of living during pre-deployment training and during actual peacekeeping 
operations.  Ukrainian peacekeeping forces could be used as a core component of a 
regionally based PKF for other countries.   
A. HYPOTHESIS 
Given that peacekeeping failures can partially be attributed to unprofessionalism 
in the armed forces that undertake these missions, this thesis proposes that the more 
professional the peacekeeping operation, the higher the chance of success for the 
peacekeeping mission.  Professionalism alone in the peacekeeping forces is obviously not 
the only factor for a successful mission, as one must take into account the willingness of 
the belligerents to participate in the process of mitigation, the political situation, etc. in 
the affected region.  However, as will be considered in this thesis, the more professional 
the peacekeeping operation, the more likely mission success. 
What is professionalism and how does it apply to peacekeeping?  To add to the 
short definition given earlier from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peacekeeping is defined as 
“Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, 
designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or 
other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political 
settlement.”8 
                                                 
8 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) as of 10 June 
1998, p. 339. 
6 
Therefore, professionalism in peacekeeping is very similar to how a professional 
military organization defines its professional ethos.  It serves as a repository of its values.  
“Proper subordination to political authority, loyalty, duty, selfless service, courage, 
integrity, respect for human dignity, and a sense of justice”9 are all a part of a 
professional peacekeeper’s identity.   
Countries that send forces and participate in peacekeeping missions, oftentimes 
going through democratic transition themselves, should take a more serious approach to 
the professionalization of their committed troops and the process of military reforms.  
This will have the dual effect of positively affecting the outcome of their peacekeeping 
missions and the process of democratization and progress of civil military relations 
within these countries as well.   
The events of September 11, 2001 dramatically changed the international security 
scene.  Transnational terrorism, extremists networks, and like organizations are now the 
military focus of strong powers led by the United States and other powerful countries.  
The need for peacekeeping though has not diminished.  For example, in Afghanistan, 
with the fall of the Taliban regime, there is a great need for international peacekeepers to 
reinforce the transitioning period in that country.   
Security-related changes around the globe have brought with them so-called “new 
security risks” or transnational threats.  NATO defines these risks or threats as 
proliferation of chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, 
floods of those seeking refuge from crises and catastrophes.10  States and international 
organizations have strengthened their capacity to react to such crises and dangers, and 
must further reinforce that capacity.  There is both a growing need for cooperation of the 
closest kind on various levels as well as a growing need for more professional 
peacekeeping forces.  Strong states would benefit from supporting regional PKFs by 
aiding in the development of competent forces.  These forces would be able to respond to 
situations where strong states had no desire or ability to do so.   
                                                 
9 Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Published by the Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 14 
June 1993, pp. 1-2. 
10 NATO-Ukrainian Charter. www.nato.int.  
7 
All nations of the world share the important responsibility of peacekeeping.  
Sharing the burden of the common goal, or to keep peace and stability in the world, will 
be, and must be, implemented by other nations, not only by great powers.  For example, 
NATO’s PfP program demonstrates how nations can come together and share the burden 
of cooperation, stabilization, and democratization of the nations/partners of this program.   
This thesis suggests that creating highly skilled and properly funded peacekeeping 
units within the Ukrainian Armed Forces will directly and positively impact the level of 
professionalism of the peacekeepers, making them more effective, professional, 
interoperable, and competent.  It is logical that involving more countries in the 
peacekeeping process will enhance the international security and stability environment.  
Using the examples of existing multinational peacekeeping units, such as the Baltic 
battalion (BALTBAT) and the UKRPOLBAT, can help develop different approaches for 
the professionalization of peacekeeping forces.  The involvement of nations within the 
region will improve the quality of each national armed force and at the same time will 
enhance regional stability and the international security environment.   
B. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used will be the case study method.  First, a survey of U.N. 
successes and failures will be presented.  Then, the study of Ukrainian participation in the 
PfP program will be examined.  Finally, the examples of UKRPOLBAT, BALTBAT, and 
some other joint peacekeeping units will be analyzed for further modeling a regional 
peacekeeping force (PKF).  Techniques include interviewing Ukrainian military 
authorities involved in the process of peacekeeping, and civilian and military authorities 
from other countries in order to find a possible solution for the creation of professional 
peacekeeping forces and sharing the burden of peacekeeping.   
The thesis will consist of five chapters, including an introduction and conclusion.  
There will be a short description of failures in peacekeeping operations with a brief 
analysis of the failures and successes.  Then, the Ukrainian experience in peacekeeping 
will be discussed, including background, functions and possible problems inside the 
UKRPOLBAT, as well as the negative impact on the personnel after their participation in 
the peacekeeping missions.  Next, the civil-military dimension of the creation of such 
8 
peacekeeping forces will be discussed, focusing on the Ukrainian role in peacekeeping.  
In the conclusion, the previous chapters will be summarized and a recommendation made 
on what should be done in order to improve the implementation of peacekeeping 
operations from the viewpoint of stabilizing the international security environment and 
democratic processes. 
As indicated, peacekeeping operations have a “hit and miss” success record.  By 
analyzing the successes and failures of various peacekeeping missions and possible future 
models for professional peacekeeping success, this thesis endeavors to map out at least 
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II. PEACEKEEPING FAILURES AND SUCCESSES: AN 
ANALYSIS  
Prior to the events of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the security environment in 
the Europe and parts of the world had improved with NATO and European Union (EU) 
successes in regional peace and harmony.  However, the events of September 11, 2001 
notwithstanding, a stable security environment—envisioned in the concept of collective 
security—in Europe and in the world as a whole had obviously not yet been achieved 
before those attacks.  Collective security itself may be defined as 
an effort by states to manage security challenges by organizing power on 
the basis of all-against-one crisis management.  The goal is to create an 
international environment in which stability emerges through cooperation 
rather than competition.  Violators of norms and principles will be 
punished through collective action.11   
While it may be expected that NATO and the EU enjoy at least limited success in 
regional peace and harmony through peacekeeping and other operations, they are not the 
only organizations that are attempting to become interdependent to foster peace and 
economic prosperity.  For example, some African nations have attempted to integrate on 
a regional basis with the establishment of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).  While most countries in SADC face a formidable series of critical 
demographic, social, economic, agricultural, energy, technological and institutional 
transitions, the commitment to “build a new SADC plus the membership of the new 
majority-led South Africa provide a new basis and more opportunities for the SADC 
countries to better manage their multiple transitions and together move toward 
sustainable development.”12  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is 
another example of a regional group founded on economic and democratic values.  Thus, 
cooperation among states and international organizations is increasing globally in both 
security and economic spheres as well as in sharing solutions to solve problems in 
transitioning democracies. 
                                                 
11 Kay, Sean. NATO and the Future of European Security, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
New York, p. 4. 
12 http://www.un.org/esa/earthsummit/sadc-cp.htm 
11 
However, regardless of the progress of interdependence and the growth of 
regional cooperation throughout the world, the concept of collective security can fail and 
has in some disastrous cases such as the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.  When U.N. 
peacekeepers have been sent in to perform their missions, they have a mixed record of 
success and failure.  One of the main problems of failed peacekeeping operations lies in 
the high demand for experienced and professional peacekeepers.  
The U.N.’s ability to play a wider and more effective role in world security affairs 
depends upon the willingness of the nations of the world to reconsider their intended use 
of the U.N. as a peacekeeping tool and upon U.N. willingness to consider basic reforms 
in its internal structure and procedures.13  Deploying professional peacekeepers is an 
important element of such basic reform.  It follows that all responsible states, particularly 
those with a history of providing peacekeeping forces that failed, such as Pakistan, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and France, should approach fundamental changes in 
the U.N. with great interest and support. 
The failures that will be examined here are the U.N. peacekeeping operations in 
the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the well-known failure in 
Somalia.  The successes reviewed will be Cambodia and El Salvador. 
Consider the following a definition of failure in peacekeeping: 
Peacekeeping forces have at different times been criticized for lack of 
mandate, ill-preparedness, weak command and control structure, shortage 
of resources and equipment and acute ineffectiveness. In hotspots like 
Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping forces failed miserably to halt the 
situation from sliding into chaos. In East Timor they failed to act as a 
deterrent and in Sierra Leone the entire contingent was abducted and kept 
in captivity by the rebels. This does not paint a very flattering picture for 
the UN.14 
In order to understand the reasons for the failed peacekeeping missions, it is 
helpful to examine the successes first.  This is particularly important as the successes of 
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Cambodia and El Salvador play an indirect role in the failures in the former Yugoslavia 
and Somalia.   
As U.N. operations became more ambitious in Angola, El Salvador, 
Namibia, and Nicaragua in the 80s-90s some foreign policy experts 
acquired an exaggerated opinion of the U.N.’s abilities.  This sentiment 
escalated after the Gulf War in which deliberations and debate at the U.N. 
figured prominently.  As crises have arisen in Cambodia, Somalia and 
Yugoslavia, world leaders have consistently turned to the U.N.  More 
recently, many countries, such as Canada, France, Belgium, have proposed 
to send in the U.N. to handle the coup in Haiti and the civil war in 
Mozambique.  Commenting on these events, the Financial Times of 
London ran a headline calling the U.N. a “victim of its own success.”15  
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was 
established to implement the 1991 Paris Accords, which were designed to end 
Cambodia’s long-running conflict and restore a legitimate government with international 
assistance.  UNTAC began in March 1992 and ended in September 1993, “amidst 
widespread praise and applause for a job well done.”16 
What did UNTAC do that was considered successful?  UNTAC “organized an 
electoral process that inspired great public enthusiasm, produced an internationally 
recognized government and helped to end Cambodia’s years of crippling isolation.”17  
Why was UNTAC successful though?  What, for example, was different about UNTAC 
from the later mission in the Balkans, UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force)?   
UNTAC showed how dramatically a field operation's fate hinges upon the 
durability of its international backing.  For UNTAC, the durable consensus 
forged in the Paris negotiations was an enormous asset.  The accords were 
marred by numerous glitches and ambiguities, some of which came to 
light only during implementation, but their basic principles (halting the 
fighting and organizing elections to support the process of political 
transition) were clear and accepted by all the major powers.  At times, it 
was difficult for UNTAC to reconcile its role as a partisan for the 
settlement with its need to remain impartial vis-à-vis the parties.  Yet the 
durability of its international backing assured that it could count on unified 
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outside support when crises arose.  No Cambodian party could disown the 
process and count on the unwavering support of a patron.18 
What really made UNTAC work though was the fact that it had a lot of support by 
the parties affected and the scale of the operation.  (UNTAC's military component was 
comprised of 12 infantry battalions, 5 engineering battalions, and support units).19  It is 
even compared to the now NATO-led force in Bosnia in terms of scale and success: 
Its large size and diverse functions were not a product of organizational 
hubris but a reflection of a negotiated peace settlement that sought to deal 
with a conflict comprehensively, in its military, social, and political 
dimensions.  Future peace settlements of equal complexity that attempt to 
translate agreements crafted by diplomats into a durable measure of 
conflict resolution will generate operations on UNTAC's scale, or greater.  
One need only look at the NATO-led peace implementation operation in 
Bosnia circa 1996 for confirmation.20   
U.N. peacekeeping in El Salvador is also considered one of the more successful 
operations recently.  What were the factors that contributed to the success in El Salvador? 
Undoubtedly the groundwork laid by a serious process of negotiation 
greatly reduced the problems of implementation.  That the negotiations 
directly and specifically addressed issues of human rights and political and 
military reform reduced the likelihood that these contentious issues would 
later threaten much-needed collaboration between the former disputants.   
Related to this point, the early deployment of human rights workers 
created a local climate of confidence in the UN, in the accords, and about 
the seriousness of the signatories.   
Finally, the relatively small size of the UN force in El Salvador actually 
worked to the advantage of the peace process.  Unlike the UN operation in 
Cambodia, for instance, with its far larger and more cumbersome 
bureaucracy, ONUSAL did not experience major delays in deploying its 
workers, setting up its offices, acquiring the necessary equipment, or 
generally going about its business.  As the peace process gathered 
momentum, ONUSAL was in a position to exploit the initial euphoria and 
the sense of urgent good will just as the parties were striving to cultivate 
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the fruit of their negotiations.  ONUSAL's logistical efficiency enhanced 
the perception that the peace accords could work.21 
With the successes of Cambodia and El Salvador, along with others such as 
Namibia, the U.N. was beginning to look like the organization that clearly had new clout 
and vigor in peacekeeping.  Although the success in Namibia was not examined here, the 
notion that the U.N. was the “go to” organization to resolve regional conflicts began with 
Namibia:  
Then, after a successful UN mission overseeing Namibia’s transition from 
South African rule in 1989, UN peacekeeping came to be seen as a kind of 
magic bullet for dealing with regional conflicts.  Demands for UN 
operations began to multiply and from spring 1991 to fall 1993 the 
Security Council (on which the United States sits as a permanent member, 
with a veto) agreed to send UN operations into ever more complex and 
dangerous environments, including unfinished civil wars.22 
The most well known disasters in U.N. peacekeeping are the operations in the 
former Yugoslavia and Somalia.  Somalia certainly represents the complete and utter 
failure of both U.N. peacekeeping and efforts by individual nation-states (notably the 
United States) to bring about peace and stability to Somalia.  The first mission in 
Somalia, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), began in September 
1992 with the arrival of Pakistani troops in Mogadishu.  The mission of UNOSOM was 
to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire between the warlords Aideed and Ali 
Mahdi and to get food provisions and supplies to the victims of the terrible famine.23 
UNOSOM, which became to known as UNOSOM I later on, did not effectively 
separate warring factions nor was successful in delivering food and relief to the needy.  
The U.N. Security Council, on 3 December 1992, voted to authorize UN member states 
“to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”24  This was the beginning of the US-led effort 
called “Operation Restore Hope” (also known in U.N. circles as the Unified Task Force 
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or UNITAF).  UNITAF began its operation on 9 December 1992 and handed over 
responsibility to the U.N. on 4 May 1993.25 
UNITAF is generally considered to have been a success.  The mission was to 
establish a secure environment in order to deliver food to distribution centers, backed by 
the deterrent and occasional punishing force of US Marines.  By March 1993, “UNITAF 
had established an environment in its area of operations in which relief could reach the 
needy, hunger diminished, and fighting subsided.”26 
However, with the US eager to turn over the operation to the U.N., UNOSOM II 
was put in charge of operations in Somalia by April 1993.  This is the point that the 
situation there began to turn sour.  The real change in policy in Somalia began with U.N. 
Resolution 837, which reaffirmed that: 
the Secretary-General is authorized under Resolution 814 to take all 
necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks . . . 
[and] those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks . . . including . . . 
their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment.27 
This particular paragraph put UNOSOM II on the path that led to the fateful 
firefight of 3 October 1993, the eventual US pullout from UNOSOM II, and an uproar in 
the US over the role of American forces in U.N. peace operations.  The ambitiousness of 
the operations in Somalia were just too much for the U.N. to handle: 
UNOSOM II was a quasi-enforcement operations assigned to an 
organization with no experience at doing law enforcement, let alone urban 
guerilla warfare.  All the normal problems of command and control 
experienced by a peacekeeping operation in calmer circumstances (lack of 
doctrine, nonstandard equipment and operating procedures, national 
checks on contingents’ freedom to follow UN orders) were magnified by 
UNOSOM II’s ambitious mandate and dangerous operating environment. 
Although Boutros-Ghali’s deliberate delay of the UNITAF-UNOSOM 
transition contributed to UNOSOM’s subsequent difficulties, his fears for 
the UN’s ability to do the job were amply justified.  The United States 
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worried about getting bogged down in this place: Why should it have 
expected the United Nations to do any better?28   
The U.N. took on a terribly difficult mission in Somalia.  The leadership of 
UNOSOM II “misjudged the capacities of its adversaries and of its own forces, as well as 
the utility of US reinforcements.  In every previous UN-commanded field operation, 
success has depended on a high degree of local support for what the UN was trying to do, 
because no such operation has ever been strong enough to impose its will(s).”29 
Some possible lessons learned from the Somalia mission, which had effect on 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia later to a degree, were the following: 
-Do not intervene in unstable countries without serious and sustained 
major power attention and backup. 
-Pick a politically savvy mission head to handle local politics and 
diplomacy. 
-Develop agreement on means and ends among troop contributing 
countries prior to deployment and consult with them regularly over the 
course of the operation. 
-Do not push local parties beyond the mission’s own capacity to defend 
itself or its capacity to sustain the push. 
-If the situation is so egregious that general conflict suppression is called 
for, do not run the operation through the UN: deputize a major power to 
serve as leader of a coalition.30 
There are, of course, many other lessons learned from Somalia.  For the purposes 
of professionalizing peacekeeping, the third lesson learned above on agreement for troop 
contributing countries to the mission is paramount.  If the troop contributing countries 
cannot deploy professional peacekeeping troops, then the mission is already in chance of 
failure due to the inadequacies of peacekeeping’s ‘coalitions of the willing.’  
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The UN operations in the Balkans represent another terrible failure. The failures 
consisted of several different factors.  One of these factors is the failure in peacekeeping 
command in the former Yugoslavia: 
The Canadian Battalion in Croatia’s Sector South, reinforced with two 
French companies, stopped and ultimately turned back a Croatian advance 
north of the Velebit Mountains in September 1993, but not before 
Croatia’s so-called “special police” had razed the area around Medak, 
killing most of the inhabitants, all of the livestock and poisoning the wells. 
But these were the result of command decisions rather than an assumption 
of responsibility by a local commander under humanitarian law.31  
The United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR-BH) 
is a glaring example of what could go wrong in peacekeeping operations.  The U.N. 
operations in all of Yugoslavia suffered many problems but the mission in Bosnia fairly 
reflects the problems in the rest of the Balkans.   
UNPROFOR faced impossible odds in Bosnia.  It was an improvised, last-
resort operation, burdened by mandates that were at times inconsistent and 
well in excess of its resource base.  It also was buffeted by sharp 
disagreements among its main sponsors on when and how to use force 
beyond self-defense.  Ultimately, however, UNPROFOR could not 
surmount the rising resentment of the local Bosnian factions.  
UNPROFOR, neither loved nor feared by any of the parties, found itself 
handicapped in promoting dialogue and lacking the clout necessary to 
compel hostile parties to negotiate. 
UNPROFOR never had the resources to implement the safe areas concept, 
which relied heavily on the "moral force" of Security Council edicts to 
protect their populations, particularly in the eastern enclaves.  The UN's 
presence probably delayed the collapse of Srebrenica and Zepa for more 
than two years, but there was really no political will in the outside world 
to prevent their collapse when the Serbs decided to move.  Moreover, the 
fixed-wing NATO air power available for use at Srebrenica in 1995 was of 
little use once the BSA (Bosnian Serb Army) changed tactics and moved 
infantry through the forest into the enclave.  Without willingness on the 
part of major powers to airlift substantial numbers of troops into the 
enclaves and their commitment to keep them supplied by air, if necessary, 
the concept of "safe area" was always a misnomer.32  
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The intervention of NATO air power truly represented the failure of the 
peacekeeping mission.  What were some of the lessons learned from the U.N. experience 
in Bosnia? 
First, the cascading deployments of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia 
show both the danger and the utility of deploying such forces to support 
partial cease-fires in larger conflicts.   
In Bosnia, where UNPROFOR helped to implement the federation 
arrangement, Muslim and Croat forces were freed for other fighting fronts 
at the Serbs' expense.  Once again, UN presence tended to channel the 
conflict in certain directions, but in this case the cause of political 
settlement was probably helped rather than hurt. 
Second, peace operations trying to remain neutral in a war zone are 
subject to manipulation by all local belligerents.  Humanitarian 
intervention delivers relief goods that all sides want and value, and these 
are obvious targets of manipulation. 
Third, every action taken by outsiders in a civil war situation affects the 
local balance of power.  Humanitarian intervention in particular favors 
whatever faction is nearest to defeat when the intervention occurs and 
whatever faction can make greater use of time to summon other resources 
to its cause.  It may be just one faction that benefits in this way, or it may 
be different ones at different times, but such an impact is unavoidable and 
sure to anger those factions who lose political-military leverage as a result. 
Fourth, mandates that rely upon the consent of all parties cannot easily be 
reconciled with those that require a peace operation to become a partisan 
of one side or another.  This was the central dilemma of the safe-area 
mission.  Although it is conceivable that adequately equipped and trained 
UN forces could have maintained "safe areas" for segments of local 
populations caught up in conflict, UNPROFOR was never so endowed and 
in any event could not have performed that mission in a neutral fashion.33 
The experience in Bosnia clearly could have used more professional peacekeepers 
as this thesis proposes.  The second and fourth lessons learned above certainly could have 
been dealt with in a more effective way had professional peacekeepers been deployed to 
Bosnia.  While the mission was not a total disaster (although from many points of view, 
especially the victims of Srebrenica and other areas, the mission was a failure), it took the 
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military and political power of NATO, not a formal U.N. military force, to enforce peace 
in Bosnia.  Professional peacekeepers could certainly have made a difference. 
What can the U.N. do to improve its peacekeeping record?  The United Nations 
has outlined a $22 million proposal to reinforce its peacekeeping operations with 250 
more jobs.  The plan “stems from a set of recommendations made by a panel of experts in 
August 2000, which said the U.N. could suffer from peacekeeping failures unless it 
created the equivalent of a ministry of defense.  The plan has to be approved by the 
General Assembly.”34  
Calls for increasing the U.N.’s military strength grow louder each day.  They 
come not only from academics but from politicians and policy makers. The U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his report to the ‘Millennium Summit’ in March 2000, 
said that besides “the need for change” and “clear, credible and achievable mandates”, it 
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III. UKRAINIAN-POLISH PEACEKEEPING BATTALION 
Ukraine and Poland have come out from under the same overcoat, the Warsaw 
Pact.  Now the Polish Army has been donning the NATO uniform for a little more than a 
year, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine are going their own way.  As Ukrainian 
generals say, building the military has assumed clearly national features.  However, 
recently Warsaw has been advising its strategic comrade, Kiev, more and more to pay 
attention at last to the Polish experience in defense reform, if only to avoid unnecessary 
pitfalls.36 
In concrete terms, the finest achievement was the 1996 decision to form a joint 
Polish-Ukrainian battalion.  The unit with a total strength of 600 servicemen is based on 
the 24th Iron Division and the 14th brigade of the Polish army stationed in Przemysl.  
Each side maintains and trains its own half at home, only to join them during exercises.  
The unit was formed for the purpose of using it in peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations.   
A. BACKGROUND 
Ukraine and Poland are the two largest countries in Central-Eastern Europe with a 
set of common fundamental interests.  They share a long period of common history and 
common European culture, but still, their political situation as to the scale of cooperation 
with the European Union and the perspectives of their respective participation in the 
process of European integration differs profoundly.  Poland is a candidate state on its way 
to full membership in the EU and Ukraine is not in spite of its European Choice 
pronounced officially at the Luxemburg meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council 
(June 8-9th 1998).  The so-called European Treaty, determines Poland has relations with 
the EU while the Ukrainian place in the process of European cooperation was determined 
by the decisions taken at the EU Helsinki summit (December 10-11th 1999) where the EU 
Common Strategy on Ukraine was adopted.  Both Poland and Ukraine are not satisfied 
with the present state of affairs.  Poland aims at full membership to be achieved as soon 
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as possible and Ukraine has declared its will to become an associated member state of the 
European Union37.   
Ukrainian-Polish cooperation, relying on the unity of views on the principal issues 
of Europe’s future, has become on our continent a factor of strategic importance.  
Intensive good neighborly relations between Ukraine and Poland belong to the important 
questions of modern Europe.  They determine the scope and human potential of both 
countries, as well as an opportunity to expand the influence of an integrated Europe.  It is, 
thus, owing to the Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership, the building of the architecture 
of European relations in terms of security receives a self-sufficient value and new 
dimension.  Ukraine supported Poland’s decision to join NATO.  Ukraine’s pragmatic 
orientation toward cooperation with the North Atlantic alliance remains unchanged, as 
evidenced by the establishment of a special partnership between Ukraine and NATO, the 
Ukraine’s participation in the Partnership for Peace Program, and by Ukrainian-Polish 
military cooperation, particularly within the framework of the Polish-Ukrainian 
Peacekeeping Battalion.  Poland was and is an advocate of the Ukraine’s aspiration for 
European integration.38 
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 
BATTALION IN THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN KOSOVO 
The initiative to create a joint military unit was taken by the defense ministers of 
Poland and Ukraine during their meeting in Solina, on 4-5 October 1995.  The basis for 
the establishment and functioning of the UKRPOLBAT is the “Agreement between the 
Republic of Poland and Ukraine on the establishment of a joint military unit for 
participation in international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under the aegis 
of international organizations”, signed by the defense ministers of Poland and Ukraine on 
26 November 1997.39 
The UKRPOLBAT came into being as a result of political decisions by the 
participating countries.  It is a concrete, tangible outcome of the trans-border military 
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cooperation among Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine.  There is a small Lithuanian platoon 
in the battalion. The initiative to create a joint military unit was taken by the defense 
ministers of Poland and Ukraine during their meeting in Solina on 4-5 October 1995.40 
UKRPOLBAT was the first combined unit ever to participate in peacekeeping 
missions with a mixed battalion staff from two countries with totally different 
backgrounds.  While Poland is a member of NATO, Ukraine is not.  Still, the two good 
neighbors manage to carry out an excellent, joint mission as part of KFOR.41  However, 
two years ago, there were Polish concerns when Ukraine did not ratify the agreement on 
the formation of this joint military unit. Due to legalities, this battalion was not sent to 
Kosovo initially as part of the NATO-led KFOR.  Finally, however, Kiev and Warsaw 
announced that the joint battalion would go to Kosovo in July 2000.42 
NATO has recognized the progress achieved by Ukraine and its peacekeeping 
abilities. NATO views these activities as positive and looks forward to further steps by 
Ukraine “to develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical economic reforms, 
and to deepen the process of integration within the full range of European and Euro-
Atlantic structures.”  In addition, based on the NATO-Ukraine Charter, the two entities 
want “to further broaden and strengthen their cooperation and to develop a distinctive and 
effective partnership, which will promote further stability and common democratic values 
in Central and Eastern Europe.”43 
As per article 2, paragraph 1, of the Agreement, the battalion may be deployed for 
international peacekeeping missions mandated by the U.N. Security Council or organized 
by other organizations responsible for the management of peace and international 
security, according to Chapter III of the U.N. Charter which refers to regional 
peacekeeping initiatives, or within international forces formed out of consensus of the 
U.N. Security Council.44 
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The Polish component of the battalion was formed by 31 March 1998.  A third 
preparatory exercise was carried out in Ukraine in September 1998.  
The United Kingdom organizes and covers costs of language training in Poland 
and Ukraine.  Canada has offered four personal computers to Poland and proposed to 
arrange training for the battalion’s HQ officers.  The United States provided for a 
language lab and offered funds for equipment acquisition and further training.   
The idea to deploy UKRPOLBAT in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo was 
put forward by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, General Olekandr Kuzmuk in June 
1999.  During the meeting in Javoriv on 25-26 April 2000, an agreement was taken on the 
substance of the technical agreement between the defense ministries of Poland and 
Ukraine on the participation of national contingents in the international peacekeeping 
operation in Kosovo, the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, within UKRPOLBAT.  The 
heads of delegations on 9 June 2000 signed the technical agreement. 
The deployment of the battalion to the mission area was undertaken by the 
national contingents.  It was realized in two deployment phases in July 2000.  The 
preparation group of 28 soldiers was sent to Kosovo on 28 June 2000.  The main forces 
of UKRPOLBAT began their activities in the area of the KFOR mission since 15 July 
2000. 
The contingent was deployed in the eastern sector (American).  Its zone of 
responsibility includes Strpce, Kacanika, and Uzewaca with the command headquarters 
in the town of Raka. 
1. The Main Tasks of the Battalion 
• Monitoring, verification and the implementation of the resolutions of the 
U.N. Security Plan and the OPLAN 10406 “JOINT GUARDIAN” in order 
to create conditions for normalization of the situation in Kosovo 
• Supporting activities of the UNHCR designed to provide humanitarian 
assistance and support the return of refugees to Kosovo 
• Ensuring law and order as well as establishing conditions for the take over 
of supervision of law and order by international organizations (OSCE and 
the U.N.) and the new local authorities 
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• Reinforcing the status and supporting organizations, the activities of which 
are directed at the provision of humanitarian aid and the democratization 
of life in Kosovo 
• Undertaking patrol missions, demining, show of force as well as ensuring 
security in the zone of responsibility 
2. Organizational Structure of the Battalion 
The battalion numbers 859 soldiers.  It consists of a Polish part, known as the 
Polish Military Contingent KFOR, drawn out of the 21 Mountain Infantry Brigade based 
in Rzeszow (562 soldiers) and the Ukrainian 208 Independent Special Battalion of the 
Western Command, Operational Area of Ukraine based in Javoriv (267 soldiers) as well 
as the Lithuanian operational platoon (30 soldiers). 
During the last three years, the battalion has been preparing for peacekeeping 
operations in addition to conducting normal military field and staff exercises.  The 
countries take great pride in sending only the best soldiers on these kinds of missions that 
KFOR represents.  Both Ukraine and Poland are well aware of problems that might occur 
because of their different connections to NATO. 
Both sides follow the same rules according to the NATO regulations, and most of 
the information that comes from NATO is for both nations to read.  Information that is 
classified for NATO members only, as a result, is protected and kept inside of the unit. 
3. Mission Implementation 
The posts of the commander, deputy commander as well as the chief of staff of 
the battalion are staffed on the basis of a 2-year rotation by Polish and Ukrainian officers.  
Currently, the commander of the UKRPOLBAT is Lt.-Colonel Bogdan Tworkowski.  His 
deputy is the Ukrainian Lt.Col. Volodimir Shkurat.45 
The battalion, according to NATO’s requirements, is self-sufficient both 
logistically and to some extent operationally.  The headquarters (HQ) is organized along 
the NATO models.  The operational companies are national, have similar strength and 
capabilities to fulfill their tasks alternatively.  The HQ and other battalion’s elements are 
bi-national.  The battalion consists of two camps that are 20 kilometers, or approximately 
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12 miles, away from each other, one on each side of the Polish/Ukrainian border.  
National elements, therefore, are stationed in home countries. 
Compatibility of the equipment was not an issue since the elements of the 
battalion came from a similar defense technological culture.   
UKRPOLBAT has accomplished several important missions in its relatively short 
period of existence.46  For example, soldiers from UKRPOLBAT in KFOR have 
destroyed ammunition confiscated during a weapons cache discovery at the beginning of 
November 2000.  “This is a great step forward in order to bring back normality to the 
province of Kosovo,” says COMKFOR Lt. Gen. Carlo Cabigiosu. 
Additionally, at the beginning of November 2000, KFOR soldiers from the 
UKRPOLBAT escorted United Nations Mission in Kosovo (U.N.MIK) policemen who 
were searching for a weapons cache in the steep mountains north of Dac Mala close to 
the border of the Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM).  They found three 
caves with weapons and ammunition, heavily booby-trapped and containing the second 
largest weapons cache confiscated by KFOR.  Ten days later COMKFOR Lt. Gen. Carlo 
Cabigiosu personally inspected part of the confiscated weapons and ammunition find, 
laid out for display at Camp Bondsteel in Multinational Brigade West (MNB W). 
At that period of time in late 2000, UKRPOLBAT (in KFOR) had confiscated 
enough weapons to equip between four or five infantry battalions.  Furthermore, Lt. Gen. 
Carlo Cabigiosu emphasized that KFOR will continue to protect the citizens of Kosovo 
from illegal weapons and ammunition.  He said, “This is one of the main activities that 
KFOR forces are conducting in the province in order to bring back normality to the 
society here. It is not normal to have this kind of equipment stored around in a normal 
country.”47 
The Polish-Ukrainian Battalion in the Multi National Brigade (MNB) East has 
been extremely busy since their arrival in Kosovo. Their area of responsibility (AOR) 
includes the border of the FYROM as well as some Serb enclaves where different kinds 
of conflicts occur from time to time.  “We have had a lot of problems in the northern part 
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of our AOR. This year two shepherds have been killed, one in June and one in October. 
Ukrainian soldiers have also been fired at by unknown shooters,” explained Lt. Col. 
Bogdan Tworkowski, the Polish Commanding Officer of the Battalion.  
The high crime rates in Kosovo are partially explained by illegal activity along 
the borders and boundaries, which is also the case in the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion's 
area. The border between Kosovo and FYROM is heavily trafficked by big trailers 
transporting goods.  “Criminals are charging taxes from the truck drivers who are waiting 
for days in order to cross the border. Our soldiers have taken care of drivers who have 
been wounded by knife cuts and gun shots, escaping from this kind of blackmail because 
they had no money to pay with,” said Lt. Col. Bogdan Tworkowski.  Whenever necessary 
or required, the Polish/ Ukrainian Battalion escorts medical convoys to the field hospital 
at the American Camp Bondsteel in MNB East. They are also involved in the 
establishment of a new health center in one of the areas for which they are responsible.  
As far as the language challenges are concerned between the UKRPOLBAT and 
the local population or even between the Polish and Ukrainian soldiers:  “We have 
interpreters that make it possible for us to communicate with the local population. When 
it comes to the soldiers, the Ukrainians and Polish can understand each other perfectly 
well in their everyday communication. The languages are very similar,” explained the 
Ukrainian Deputy Commander of the Battalion, Lt. Col. Volodimir Shkurat.  
Four days a week the battalion organizes the escorting of Kosovar Serbs through 
the surrounding Albanian areas, all the way to Serbia and FYROM. This freedom of 
movement makes it possible for the Serbs to visit family and old friends, a service that is 
highly appreciated. The transportation of material for the Polish Red Cross and other Non 
Governmental Organizations (NGO) also benefits from the protective escort service.  
Undoubtedly, the personnel of UKRPOLBAT are doing their duty accordingly.  In 
February 2001 there was a planned rotation for part of the personnel of the Polish 
Military Contingent KFOR (32 professional soldiers). 
The activities of the troops from the UKRPOLBAT have been well received by 
the local population, which reflects the fact that they enjoy security provided by the 
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battalion. The soldiers are regarded as defenders of freedom and peace, effectively and 
decisively responding to any sign of the violation of the law.48 
An excerpt from the speech given during the meeting of the Presidents of Poland, 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, and of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma with troops from the Polish-
Ukrainian Battalion in Kosovo can give a picture of implementation of the mission by the 
unit: 
We have created joint battalions for peacekeeping missions in the entire 
world with Ukraine and Lithuania… The joint Polish-Ukrainian Battalion, 
which we created not long ago, is passing an exam in difficult, challenging 
conditions. It is passing an exam bravely and effectively. I know that your 
service is hard and often dangerous. I know that it is associated with many 
hardships, but I also know that your approach to responsibilities is the way 
it should be. Oblivious to difficulties you fulfill your tasks as best as 
possible. Cooperating together you provide an example to the young 
generation from Poland, Ukraine. You give an example to your nations on 
how we should build the present and the future. For this I am sincerely 
grateful to you, for this I thank commanders, Polish and Ukrainian 
soldiers, as well as Lithuanian soldiers and officers present here. I wish 
that your service would bring as much security and peace as possible here 
in Kosovo, as much satisfaction for you as possible, and for us Presidents 
of Ukraine and Poland all the more reason for a well-justified pride49. 
In addition to this speech, emphasizing the high estimation of the implementation 
of the job of all personnel of the UKRPOLBAT, as specified by Secretary General of 
NATO, Lord Robertson at the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defense 
Ministers Session: 
At present 300 Ukrainian servicemen participate in K-FOR operations 
providing essential helicopter support in Kosovo. The Polish-Ukrainian 
battalion deployed for the first time is doing an outstanding job. This is a 
well-appreciated contribution to projecting stability in Europe and a 
visible example of how the practical cooperation between NATO and 
Ukraine has matured over time. Congratulations to these and all members 
of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.50 





Amongst all the possible problems that can exist in the unit, such as language, 
financial, social, and welfare for the families, are interoperability and logistic support. 
Yet, both sides appreciated the support given by some NATO countries.  For instance, the 
UK, US, and Canada have helped with English training courses and teaching materials.  
Also, the US assists with equipment, supplies, and language laboratories while the French 
provide some medical equipment for the battalion’s medical section. 
NATO has been encouraged by Ukraine’s decision to carry forward reform of its 
armed forces and to share those plans with NATO.  Many of the proposals on how best to 
support Ukraine’s plans for reform and development of the UAF have been discussed in 
NATO.  Civil and military authorities of NATO allies are prepared to share their 
experiences and stand ready to give their support to Ukraine and to its MOD.51 
Ukraine and Poland will face new challenges in the coming years. Poland 
will become a member of the European Union and Ukraine will face the 
prospect of establishing good-neighborly relations with EU. We consider 
it an undeniable fact that Ukraine and Poland, while intensively 
cooperating in numerous spheres, have an opportunity to make a 
significant contribution in building a safe neighborhood between the 
European Union and countries that are not its members.52 
However, NATO membership has not diminished Poland’s interest in the reliable 
and friendly relations it maintains with Ukraine, its neutral neighbor. “We always 
carefully watch developments in your country. And we have worried very seriously more 
than once about your independence. For there is no independent Poland without 
independent Ukraine,” these words of Polish-born American political scientist Zbigniew 
Brzezinski were often repeated in the defense agency’s strategic studies department.  In 
practice, it is with Poland that Ukraine shows its most fruitful cross-border military 
cooperation. Meetings of defense ministers, general staff chiefs, and commanders of the 
two adjacent military districts of the Krakow-based district in Poland and Ukraine’s 
Western Operational Command have become so usual that it is difficult to count them.  
Last year the two armies carried out 32 joint actions instead of the 43 planned, but they 
also conducted 12 unscheduled ones. “Fifty or so joint actions is a small figure for our 




large armies. But in the future we should carry out operations more concrete than mere 
ritual shows,” the Warsaw spokesman said at NATO headquarters.53  
All of these experiences illustrate that the UAF and the Polish military could 
mobilize as many as 2,300 soldiers and would be outnumbered only by the British, 
French and possibly German contingents.54  Of course, not only men but equipment 
count in that calculation.  There are still efficient efforts by Warsaw and Kiev that may 
provide the opportunity to promote Polish-Ukrainian military cooperation as an important 
part of the European capability for out of area operations within the scope of the 
Petersberg missions. Therefore, it is the urgent task for our both governments to: 
• Do their best to give the Polish-Ukrainian battalion a full operational 
capability as soon as possible 
• Promote the Polish-Ukrainian military cooperation in the West showing 
Ukraine as a contributor to European security and Poland as a champion of 
effective cooperation on security issues within the region 
• Include the Polish-Ukrainian battalion, using the precedents created by 
PfP, Kirchberg Declaration55, IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, in the military 
operations of the EU should the European Union undertake any and 
exploit that fact politically 
• Solve all the possible legal problems in Polish-Ukrainian relations 
constituting potential obstacles for the unit to react quickly in a crisis 
situation. The battalion having 744 soldiers will be noticeable among the 
contingents of other states only in the first stage of operation, when the 
concentration of forces is poor. Any political benefits will be therefore 
possible only if our two states are able to act quickly 
• Create a sufficient financial reserve for such operations in the budgets of 
our respective defence ministries 
C. RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
The successful strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture will not 
only depend on NATO's efforts but will require including Russia and Ukraine at the 
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30 
highest possible level56 due to Ukraine’s geopolitical position and Russia’s potentials in 
terms of economy, military might and future democratic developments of these countries.   
Bringing Europe more closely together cannot, and should not, exclude the 
continent's easternmost and by far largest country: Russia.  It, too, is a part of Europe. 
How Russia will place itself in this new Europe is one of the most important questions to 
be faced in the years ahead.57  
The end of the Cold War radically changed the relations between NATO and the 
Soviet Union and its largest successor state. Before the Kosovo campaign, Russia had 
slowly increased cooperation with NATO. In 1991, the country joined the NACC and in 
1994 the PfP. So-called "16+1" meetings were held at the Ministerial, Ambassadors' and 
experts' level. Progress was achieved in a number of areas, including cooperation in 
dealing with the consequences of natural disasters. NATO and Russia cooperation was 
crucial for reaching the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
1996, NATO and Russia signed the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security", which established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).58  
NATO and Russia are working successfully together on the ground in Kosovo and 
Bosnia. However, close cooperation is needed across the full spectrum of issues of 
common concern from managing regional crises to preventing the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction. It is welcomed that the new Russian government decided to reestablish 
ties with NATO, after it severed them as a result of the Kosovo campaign. Russia viewed 
NATO's action as interfering with the post-Cold War rules and the U.N. framework. It is 
hoped that the Russian Federation will join all which was created to conduct an extensive 
dialogue on the relevant security issues. This is particularly the case for the Duma, which 
still has not reestablished its relationship and work program with the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly.59  
                                                 






In the context of Russian frustration with the Kosovo campaign, but particularly 
because of Chechnya and Russia's reactions to international criticism about its conduct of 
the Chechen war, leading Russian politicians have occasionally signaled that Russia may 
pursue a more assertive foreign policy towards the West. This is also true for newly 
elected President Putin, even though he has at the same time stressed that he wants to 
conduct a pragmatic course towards NATO. In an open letter to the voters, Vladimir 
Putin called for the reassessment of Russian foreign policy, giving up the claims of being 
a superpower: “If Russia is being urged to address global concerns costing a lot of 
money... we must weigh up our capabilities and perhaps wait a little. Only the country's 
real interests, including economic ones, should be the law for Russian diplomats”. The 
new Russian government is still shaping its policies and it seems that there is not yet an 
agreement in Russia on the priorities. While the parliamentary and presidential election 
campaigns of 1999 and 2000 stressed the preponderance of Russian national interests 
over international agreements, this should not necessarily be taken at face value to 
measure Russian behavior. What is important is how the new Russian government will 
pursue its declared goals. The question is whether Russia will conduct a foreign and 
security policy in a cooperative manner, that is, whether it recognizes the legitimate 
interests of its partners and neighbors. Or whether it will try to aggressively push through 
its interests, particularly against smaller countries and against what some Russian policy 
makers sometimes call the near abroad. Certainly, Russia's future foreign and security 
policy will depend on both internal and external factors. It can only further Russia's own 
interests if the newly elected government, supported by the Duma and the Federation 
Council, will continue the reform processes with new vigor. The West, including NATO, 
will continue to help, if Russia abides by its international obligations.60  
In a recent BBC (2002) interview with David Frost, Mr. Putin did not even 
exclude Russian NATO membership some time in the future. While this may sound 
unlikely for the immediate future, we should not dismiss his statement as mere campaign 
talk but rather as a possible, and encouraging, sign to indicate a change of opinion toward 
NATO. NATO should make it clear that in the long term Russia would be welcome as a 
member if it meets the criteria as any other applicant country. Of course, including a 
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country as large and important as Russia would require the Alliance to make necessary 
adjustments to its existing structure, particularly the decision-making process.  
However, at present and for the immediate future, Russia's war in Chechnya has 
raised a number of questions and some fears in neighboring countries. As Norway's chief 
of Defense Gen. Sigurd Frisvold has put it, “[the Chechen war reminds us that] we are 
still a neighbor to the largest military power in Europe. There is no threat of an invasion, 
but the situation is unpredictable.” The international community has repeatedly 
condemned Russian conduct in Chechnya as a violation of human rights. Russia, 
however, has rejected all criticism as interference in its internal affairs, defining its 
actions there as a military campaign against terrorists. It is difficult for NATO and its 
member countries to develop, and hopefully strengthen, a strategic partnership if its 
counterpart does not abide by universally accepted international conventions.61  
Other contentious issues between NATO and Russia concern U.S. plans to 
develop and deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) and further NATO 
enlargement. “NATO enlargement will by no means weaken Russia's security.”62 On the 
contrary, enlargement will improve the relations between Russia and its Central and 
Eastern European neighbors. With these countries being NATO members, they will be 
strongly interested in enhancing cooperation with Russia and will seek to involve Russia 
in a process of ensuring peace in Europe. An excellent example is the first enlargement 
round. “Russia was opposed to it as well, but after the first round, this is no longer an 
issue and these relations tend to improve.”63  
Russia's cooperation with NATO within the framework of EAPC, PfP and other 
forums should provide an opportunity to discuss the enlargement issue and thus convince 
it of the mutual benefits of the process. Cooperation in strengthening the role of other 
international organizations, such as the OSCE, is also an important common interest. “It 





is to be hoped that the new Russian government under President Putin will pursue a more 
active, cooperative partnership with NATO.”64  
Given the colossal tasks waiting for President Putin, Russia's direct course is 
presently unclear. Due to its sheer size neither its falling apart nor its turning into a real 
democracy based on a market economy seem likely in the short run. Rather, we can 
expect tendencies both towards self-isolation and towards increased cooperation with the 
West. NATO should, whenever possible, help Russia to develop the latter. This will 
require the Alliance and its member countries to create, and sustain, a more clearly 
defined common approach towards Russia. Such a policy would not provide Russia with 
the right to veto NATO enlargement and it would have to underline the importance of 
abiding by international (human rights) obligations. However, it would, at the same time, 
make it clear that the Alliance shows sensitivity towards Russia's security concerns and is 
willing to integrate these concerns seriously. This will require65:  
• The development of an explicit set of proposals towards strengthening the 
transparency of the PJC, including its parliamentary component (via the 
NATO-PA/Duma Monitoring Group) 
• The strengthening rather than jeopardizing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) regime, including a continued dialogue on Arms Control 
• The advancement of the discussion on joint counter-terrorism measures 
In short, Russia is definitely a great and important country. To have balance and 
harmony in European stability, it is necessary to count and rely on Russia’s tremendous 
capability. If it is necessary to integrate Russia into European security architecture, 
Ukraine certainly cannot be left out.  
Ukraine, the largest single country positioned between Russia and NATO, is an 
important player in European security. It is unlikely to join NATO anytime soon but 
establishing closer ties with Western institutions clearly is in Kyiv's interest. Since 
Ukrainian membership in NATO has been kept open as an option for the future, Ukraine-
NATO relations have a potential to influence NATO-Russia relations. They could 
generate irritation or even contribute to the development of tensions between NATO and 
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Russia in case NATO-Ukrainian bilateral ties became ever closer and would be perceived 
to be directed against its interests by Moscow.66 
The Balkan countries can take a more active role in promoting regional stability 
and assisting their neighbors in furthering the security agenda. In a positive recent 
development, several Balkan neighbors signed an agreement to establish a Multinational 
Peace Force for Southeastern Europe. Such a force should be steadily developed and 
engaged to become interoperable with NATO in a range of Alliance missions. 
Montenegro itself could include itself in this initiative and offer Podgorica as a base of 
operations. 
The Polish-Ukrainian battalion that has been exploited in the interests of two great 
countries symbolizes the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. “The formation, equipping and 
sending of a joint battalion on this mission is a great success of Poland and Ukraine. This 
proves once again that we can co-operate, break down barriers and prejudices from the 
past,” stated Polish Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski67. 
The battalion came into being as a result of political decision of the countries as 
well as a concrete, tangible outcome of the bi-lateral trans-border military cooperation 
among Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania. 
The Polish-Ukrainian Battalion should be considered as a model for the future 
development of a national-based PK unit dedicated to only peacekeeping missions.  
While there is a small part of the UAF that is dedicated to professional peacekeeping, 
there is no standardized structure or devoted peacekeepers who are highly professional 
that can effectively deploy any peacekeeping missions.   
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE IN 
PEACEKEEPING 
Every nation should be responsible for promoting peace and international 
security.  Nations committed to collective security, of which peacekeeping is a part, 
should take the PfP program as a model for developing a structure to secure peace and 
improve burden sharing.  The burden of pursuing the common goal of peace and 
international security must be shared by all nations, not only by countries that are 
considered strong states.  Involving more countries in the peacekeeping process will 
enhance international security and stability.  Using the examples of existing multinational 
peacekeeping units, such as the BALTBAT and UKRPOLBAT, would help develop 
improved approaches for the professionalization of peacekeeping forces.  Creating 
peacekeeping units based on the UAF, and increasing the payment of serving personnel 
who are directly involved in peacekeeping, would directly and positively affect the level 
of professionalism of the peacekeepers, and make them more effective and competent. 
This chapter examines Ukrainian experiences in peacekeeping, including origins, 
functions, and possible problems in the Ukrainian approach to peacekeeping.  
Additionally, this thesis further analyzes the effects of peacekeeping training and 
operations on personnel before and after participation in UN missions as well as possible 
solutions to the identified problems.  The findings of this work could be used as a 
framework for ongoing activities of reorganization and redefinition of the UAF, 
especially for peacekeeping activities.  One of the possible models for the future creation 
and development of peacekeeping activities is the UKRPOLBAT.  An analysis and short 
description of the UKRPOLBAT are also presented in this chapter. The focus will be on 
peacekeeping activities since 1991. 
The development of the independent UAF started with a small patriotic group that 
initiated an organization of the Ukrainian national army in the fall of 1989.  This group’s 
goals were to return all Ukrainians to their homeland, separate the Ukrainian armed 
forces from those of other nations, create Ukrainian military schools, and outlaw the 
communist party within the military.  Thus, the framework for the creation of the 
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independent UAF was already in progress before the fall of the Soviet Union.  Ukraine 
was the first nation among all the former Soviet republics to form independent national 
armed forces.  “One of the greatest, and, to date, most poorly recognized, successes 
accompanying the drive for Ukraine's independence was the rapid and peaceful 
transformation of the Soviet military units on its territory in the fall of 1991 into an 
independent military force.”68  The first decree, dated 10 September 1991, by the 
Ukrainian Parliament (Supreme Soviet or Verkhovna Rada, VR) was entitled “On 
Military Formations of Ukraine.”  It placed all troops on the national territory, including 
their weapons, technology and administrative staff, under Ukrainian jurisdiction.   
In November 1991, the Supreme Soviet (V.R.), to ensure military loyalty, issued a 
decree that required all troops to take an oath of loyalty to defend the Ukrainian people 
and territory.  A law on the UAF was passed along with the law on defense on December 
6, 1991, the official Day of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  Finally, a decree from the 
President of Ukraine on 5 April 1992 ordered subordination of all military formations on 
Ukrainian soil to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) 69.  In October 1992, the first 
Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Kostiantin Morozov, promulgated a military doctrine for 
Ukraine.  The doctrine, approved by the V.R. a year later, includes politico-military and 
military-technical aspects.  
Politico-Military Aspects 
• Ukraine advances no territorial claims on other states and does not 
acknowledge territorial claims on itself 
• Ukraine supports principles of mutual respect and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries 
• Ukraine insists on its non-bloc status 
• The use of the Ukrainian armed forces in dealing with internal political 
problems is prohibited 
Military-Technical Aspects 
• The UAF are configured to wage large-scale conventional war 
• The UAF need to be supplied with world-class weaponry, especially 
precision strike, air, air defense and missile systems, electronic warfare 
obile units and an ocean-going navy elements, air m
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• The UAF will undertake substantial redeployments in order to organize an 
effective defense in all directions 
• Political and diplomatic efforts will be made to defuse potentially 
explosive situations and to reduce the risks of confrontation 
• Ukraine will create all-volunteer (professional) armed forces70 
As with any country pursuing a process of democratization, the Ukraine’s military 
has a role in the transition process.  However, Ukraine has enforced civilian control over 
the military in order to prevent the “restoration of the USSR,” any reintegration with 
Russia and CIS military structures, and for the great reduction of the pro-union armed 
forces on its territory.71 
As a young independent state, Ukraine has acquired experience through 
participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world since the very first year of 
its independence.72  This fact has given its political leaders a strong motivation to 
considerably strengthen the state legislative base.  As a result, in April 1999, the V.R. of 
Ukraine adopted a law entitled “On Participation of Ukraine in the International 
Peacekeeping Operations.” This law reflected the recent growth of international 
peacekeeping activities and provided opportunities for the Ukraine’s participation in 
them.   
Ukraine has become an important contributor of troops to U.N. and NATO-led 
peacekeeping operations (PKOs).  Over twelve thousand military personnel and civilians 
from Ukraine have fulfilled their duty in these missions of peace.  Twenty-three have lost 
their lives and more than sixty have been wounded.  On 1 January 2001, the Ukraine’s 
participation in the current U.N. peacekeeping operations and missions was as follows: 73  
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 U.N.IFIL (South Lebanon) An engineer battalion of 650 men. 
U.N.AMSIL (Sierra Leone) A maintenance and training 
battalion of 540 men. 
U.N.MIK (Kosovo, FRY) Special police unit of 115 men, 
Special police dog-unit of 35 men, 
36 civilian police officers, 
1 liaison and 1 civil affairs officer. 
U.N.MIBH (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 39 civilian police officers, 
3 civil affairs officers. 
U.N.MOP (Prevlaka, Croatia) 1 military observer. 
U.N.MEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea) 5 military observers. 
MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 4 military observers. 
U.N.TAET (East Timor) 8 civilian police officers. 
U.N.OMIG (Georgia) 1 civil affairs officer. 
U.N.SMA (Afghanistan) 1 liaison officer. 
Total: 1440 persons. 
  
Table 1.   Ukrainian Participation in Peacekeeping Missions. 
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Figure 1.   Participation of Ukrainian Military Units in Peacekeeping Operations. 
From: Ukrainian MoD, the Partnership for Peace and Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Center 
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Besides, about 220 people are part of the Ukrainian contingent in KFOR in 
Kosovo and more than 400 men are serving in SFOR, both NATO-led peacekeeping 
operations. In quantitative terms, Ukraine became the ninth member state in 1997, out of 
more than eighty troop-contributing states.  In fact, Ukraine signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the United Nations regarding its contributions to the U.N. Standby 
Arrangements. Since 1997 Ukraine has doubled its contribution to that system and 


































































































































Figure 2.   Contributions to U.N. and NATO-Led Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). 
From: Valentyn Kurzhos, Peacekeeping Activity of Ukraine: Experience and Perspectives, Thesis 
for the Master of Art in Foreign Affairs. Also available on www.un.org/Dests/dpko/pub/pko.htm 
 
On 15 July 1992, the Ukrainian V.R. released a decree for the deployment of the 
240th separate special battalion to the former Yugoslavia.  Since that initial step, the 
Ukraine’s active participation in peacekeeping has been successful.  In addition to 
standard peacekeeping tasks, Ukrainian personnel were involved in specific peacemaking 
activities such as the separation of warring factions in Zhepa and Gorazde in 1993-1994.  
In addition, they participated in the protection of workers who reconstructed and rebuilt a 
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local hospital, a school, roads, and the Sarajevo’s tramway line, the oldest in Europe.  
The first tram that left the depot was painted with the yellow and blue colors of the 
Ukrainian flag.   
Despite this, the so-called "frozen" conflicts in some post-Soviet republics, such 
as those involving Abkhazia, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, have created tensions and 
destabilization in South-Eastern Europe and Ukraine in particular. The situation in the 
Transdnistrian area also needs to be resolved.  Any delay in resolving these conflicts 
might lead to tragic results.  The suffering of civilians in the Caucasus and the poverty of 
the population “make active peacekeeping efforts indispensable.”75  
Leonid Kuchma, the President of Ukraine, supports the participation of Ukraine in 
peacekeeping. 
In Ukraine, we know the price of peace and security. Our people survived 
the horrors of the most bloody and destructive war in the history of 
humankind. This is why Ukraine remains committed to the peacemaking 
and peacekeeping activities under the U.N. banner. This is one of the 
genuine and concrete ways in which Ukraine affirms its responsibilities as 
a member of the Security Council.76 
Ukraine remains committed to strengthening the leading role of the United 
Nations in the maintenance of peace and international security and to enhancing its 
peacekeeping potential.  Yet, Ukrainian participation in peacekeeping received respectful 
as well as negative feedback after making such contributions.  In analyzing UAF 
contributions to peacekeeping, one should identify possible problems that derive from 
recruiting, pre-deployment training, deployment to a mission area, and post-deployment 
after the rotation of a unit and the soldier’s return to either civilian life or continuing 
service in the armed forces. 
A. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONNEL BEFORE AND AFTER 
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 
Problems with recruiting and pre-deployment training for the personnel and 
chronic underfunding of Ukraine’s military have seriously affected, and will continue to 
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affect, attempts to restructure the UAF. For example, rapid downsizing of the military has 
caused difficulties due to the poor job opportunities in other sectors of the Ukrainian 
economy and the state’s financial obligations to those released from service.77       
The military must be embedded within the society,78 thus, in the UAF, both 
conscripts and officers usually live in poor conditions. Substandard housing combined 
with a poor diet has contributed to some health problems among conscripts, who in many 
cases are already in poor physical condition when they begin their military service.79 “A 
relatively small percentage of draft-age youth (according to one estimate, 11,5%) are 
conscripted, an increasing percentage of those who are drafted have a limited educational 
background, and draft evasion [was] common”80 before 1996-7.   
The recruiting system, far before the UAF’s existence, was negatively changed 
during and after the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan war.  This system is less than fully 
satisfactory due to the unwillingness of some strata of society to “give” their sons to the 
army.  Women are not subject to conscription in the UAF, but they may serve voluntarily.  
Most of the personnel for the armed forces come from rural areas with low standards of 
education, and they are often in poor health.  The conscripts from urban areas come 
typically from poor families.  Wealthier people try to avoid military service and use all 
possible measures to keep their sons out of the army.  For many young urban Ukrainians 
a stint in the army is a throwback to a murky time that is perceived as a sentence for a 
crime they never committed.81  
The growth of the unpopularity of military service appears to have bottomed out 
at the end of 1997, largely because of very poor job opportunities in the civilian sector. 
This has been reflected in a growing competition for admission to military educational 
institutions.82  Terrible unemployment among both conscripts and officers occurred after 
                                                 
77 Jaworsky, Armed Forces and Military Policy w/n Ukraine in the World, p. 229, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA.  
78 H. Gaffney, Why Should Civilians Control the Military and How Should They Do It? p. 4.  
79 Jaworsky, Armed Forces and Military Policy w/n Ukraine in the World, p. 230. 
80 Ibid. 
81 William Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, Yale University Press, 1998. p. 247. 
82 See Ukrainian newspaper Den’ 18 July and 13 November 1997, available on www.den.com. 
43 
the dismissal of the National Guard (NG) in 1999.  More than half of the NG officer 
corps were former Army officers, but the NG was paid better than the military which is 
why they joined the NG in the first place.  In addition, Ukraine has a “top-heavy” military 
over-staffed with senior officers.  Like other post-communist militaries, the UAF suffers 
from a lack of capable and well-trained junior officers83 and non-commissioned officers.  
Not only are the wage payments to military personnel very low, the payments are 
also often delayed for months on end and are insufficient to provide for family needs. The 
situation varies from branch to branch.  Unemployment among service members’ wives 
in many garrisons is a common issue. About 35% of officers’ and enlisted personnel’s 
wives “cannot find a job; in some garrisons their share amounts to nearly 52%.”84  
Housing is another grievance.  “In December 1997 almost 70,000 servicemen and their 
families did not have their own accommodations, and over 33,000 retired and reserve 
officers were on waiting lists to receive housing.”85  Further, “They live in barracks and 
other communal quarters, and in 1997 the state budget allowed only 800 new apartments 
to be assigned to military personnel to help deal with this housing shortage.”86  In such 
circumstances, many officers and enlisted personnel have adopted an array of survival 
strategies, including relying on support from relatives and raising crops and domestic 
animals on garrison territory and its vicinities mainly designated for these purposes.87   
A significant element in assessing possible remedies for the UAF is the courage 
of the officer corps. Even though, they constitute only 28%,88 their role in the armed 
forces is crucial: 
Such socially important values as moral authority, family life, quietude, 
zest for life, social activity and patriotism, are suppressed.  Instead, the 
environment encourages values which are evidently negative: 
consumerism, passivity, solitude, cynicism and skepticism.  The majority 
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of officers suggest that present Ukrainian society encourages, above all, 
push and enterprise.  Public activity towards leadership and power, 
frugality and temporization also remain realistic.   
[It is noticeable a tendency to] further decrease in social activity…[and] 
certain signs of officer aloofness toward the society they serve. 
Military service for [some] of Ukrainian officers is…a priority value by 
itself, but it should be associated with adequate well-being; service 
condition are less important.89 
Pre-deployment training for future peacekeepers is not only insufficient, but also 
often incompetent.  It is insufficient because of shortages of fuel, maintenance problems, 
inadequate transportation resources and deficits in material supplies.  Incompetence in the 
training often occurs due to inexperienced officers and enlisted men, and also because of 
low wages. For example, for a company commander, who is considered the most 
responsible person in the armed forces structure for equipment and supplies, the task of 
training his soldiers is often very difficult, if not impossible, due to the obstacles listed 
above. However, without proper training, a suitable implementation of peacekeeping duty 
is doubtful. On the other hand, an optimistic sign is that the majority of the personnel of 
the UAF have a predisposition to high professionalism and outstanding performance of 
their service. 
B. DURING AND AFTER THE PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACEKEEPING 
MISSION: REALITY 
As soon as a unit is deployed on a mission, something strange usually happens to 
the personnel.  On some occasions, some UAF troops have gotten “out of hand” after 
being deployed on a peacekeeping mission.  The discipline of some soldiers often 
becomes poor almost instantly after deployment into the mission area.  However, once 
the deployment of the personnel has taken place, it is quite difficult to get rid of or to 
send back to Ukraine of a soldier who has become undisciplined.  At this point, the UAF 
face two problems: 1) reduced training for young officers, and 2) insufficient education 
of enlisted personnel, most of whom were called up for military service just before the 
peacekeeping mission.   
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Another problem is that most of the deployed personnel have one short-term goal: 
to get their salary and return to civilian life.  Thus, the valuable professionalism and 
accumulated experience of the peacekeeping personnel are lost.  In addition, troops have 
faced uncertainty after completing the peacekeeping mission and have expressed an 
unwillingness to continue service in the UAF. 
Finally, one can assume that many veterans of military conflicts are suffering 
physical, social, and psychological problems because of their involvement in combat and 
related military activities, as it was happening with many veterans of the Vietnam and 
Gulf wars in the U.S or of the Afghanistan’s was in the Soviet Union. 
C. NEGATIVE AFTERMATH 
According to Michael Williams,90 peacekeeping is one of the most arduous and 
complex tasks that a military organization can face.  Civilian and military personnel are 
working together to a greater degree than ever before. However, when an international 
institution like the U.N. makes strategic decisions, it does so with little input from the 
military.  As a result, in the field there have been clashes of culture and confusion over 
command when the U.N. has worked with organizations such as NATO or the OSCE. 
The problems have included disjointed management of operational control arrangements 
and insufficient operational coordination. These issues and the uneven record of 
achievements have contributed to a decline in the number of U.N. peacekeeping 
operations since 1994. 
According to D.C. Jett, “The U.N. is always short of the personnel it needs for 
peacekeeping operations. First World countries with first-rate armies are usually 
unwilling to put their troops at risk.”91  Thus, these operations are often assigned to Third 
World countries, and the U.N. sends some of the worst soldiers in the world to places 
where it can only hope they are not called on to do anything.92 
Ukraine has taken steps to reform its military structure.  Round table discussions 
in February 2000 among more than a hundred experts, including the People’s Deputies of 
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the Verkhovna Rada, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economics, all 
power structures and NATO representatives, suggested that a “State Commission for 
Military Reform…should be formed without delay.”  100% of the participants gave a 
positive answer to a question of whether Ukraine needs military reform.93 
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Figure 3.   The Preconditions for Successful Implementation of Military Reform. 
From: A. Gritsenko at al, Military Reform in Ukraine: Expert Opinion Poll, p. 32. 
The current downsizing of the UAF has not improved the lives of officers and 
enlisted personnel.  There is a hope that in two to three years the living conditions will 
improve. Yet, the personnel now leaving the armed forces are either very resourceful and 
capable of adapting to civilian life, or totally hopeless and is going to exist somehow by 
remaining in the armed forces structure, even if often unsuited to military duties. 
Even though Ukrainian peacekeepers provided a solid performance throughout 
their participation in PKOs, it is the necessary to conceptually change the approach to 
training and preparing for peacekeeping missions.  The ongoing reform should consider 
peacekeeping as a parallel option for further development of part of the UAF.  The MoD 
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cooperating with foreign assistance should sponsor and oversee the creation and 
development of a dedicated peacekeeping unit. 
The following part of this chapter analyzes the opportunity to develop such a unit. 
D. THE NEED FOR CHANGE: MEASURES FOR IMPROVING “POST-
MISSION” OUTCOMES FOR PERSONNEL 
Ukraine and the UAF have to reassess their role and participation in peacekeeping 
operations.  A newly independent state during its transition period of democratic 
consolidation should receive assistance from the advanced democracies with regard to 
legislative and economic matters as well as activities such as peacekeeping.  
Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral peacekeeping operations have become 
more numerous, complex and diverse.  They are not only military but also political and 
humanitarian in nature.  Calls for increasing the military strength of peacekeepers grow 
louder each day. These calls were spurred by the end of the Cold War.  Previously, many 
of the world’s “hot” wars were fought between entities allied with the two rival 
superpowers.94 Nowadays, however, the leaders of all countries should consider ways to 
deal with future regional conflicts. The Ukrainian-Polish battalion is one of the models 
for consideration to solve the problem of unprofessional and weak performance in 
peacekeeping. 
E. MILITARY EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO 
PREVENT PROBLEMS 
The high demand for experienced and professional peacekeepers, which changes 
the whole perception of modern peacekeeping, may create an opportunity for the UAF 
and other national military establishments that wish to emulate the Ukrainian experience 
in peacekeeping.  However, a clear shortfall is the lack of a professional military 
education system for peacekeeping to capitalize on this valuable experience.   
The Ukrainian MoD, cooperating with the government, needs to increase funding 
and support for the military education system.  It should be considered a high priority in 
defense spending.   
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Because of downsizing, increased operations tempo in operations other 
than war and the technological challenges of the Information Age, 
[education] was even more essential to the leaders…in the twenty-first 
century. As the force size decreases, education becomes even more 
essential, because this new force faces increasing challenges and must be 
forced to do more with less.95 
Ethics and morality play an important role in the professional education of a 
peacekeeper.  These two subjects must be continually reinforced throughout the 
instruction.  Personnel with valuable peacekeeping experience should share their 
knowledge.  Leadership training for peacekeeping should be developed for both officers 
and enlisted men.   
Professional peacekeeping training is certainly not the same as conventional 
tactics and procedures for conducting a large-scale war.  In peacekeeping, the objective is 
to prevent a renewal of fighting in regional conflicts.  Rules of Engagement (ROE) are 
the key words in the arena of peacekeeping.  ROE represent the most sensitive part of 
peacekeeping operations, and they should be emphasized throughout the educational and 
training process.  Moreover, some types of police work for peacekeepers must be 
introduced and developed.  As an officer’s technical and tactical proficiency must be 
enhanced, for example, in terms of ROE, so must his moral and ethical character.   
As the force size diminishes, education becomes even more critical, especially 
amongst the leaders. Military education does not guarantee professionalism and good 
civil-military relations, but it does provide substantial insurance against the lack 
thereof.96  An educated military will be more respected by the civilian leadership and will 
be more capable of dealing with the strains of the civil-military relationship.97 
To coordinate all peacekeeping activities of the Ukrainian MoD, the Partnership 
for Peace and Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Center (PfP & PKO CC) of the 
Ukrainian General Staff was established on 4 October 1997. This Center serves the 
Partnership for Peace Program by offering the Ukrainian MoD, in close cooperation with 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council, the opportunity to take 
part in European military and peacekeeping activities and by promoting security and 
stability in the region.  
The main functions of the Center are:  
• to supervise Ukrainian participation in PfP activities 
• to plan and control PfP activities for the Departments and Services of the 
MoD 
• to collaborate with the Government and Parliament in issuing PfP and 
peacekeeping regulations 
• to select and to train Ukrainian peacekeeping personnel 
• to maintain the operational stand-by status of Ukrainian peacekeeping 
units 98  
Officers of the PfP & PKO CC conduct regular peacekeeping courses for 
candidates to the Ukrainian contingents in peacekeeping missions. The duration of the 
course is three weeks and the number of attendees varies from 25 to 30. Candidates are 
selected from volunteers in all services and branches of the Armed Forces according to 
their English proficiency.  The course includes language training provided by native 
speakers of English or teachers from the English Teaching Project for Ukraine.  The 
course also entails briefings, syndicate work and exercises conducted by officers of the 
PKO Division of the Center. The Center trains personnel to be U.N. military observers, 
staff officers, military policemen and interpreters.99  
In a positive aspect of the lessons learned, the Ukrainian Peacekeeping Veterans 
Association works in close contact with the PfP&PKO CC through the International 
Peacekeeping Network (INTERPEACENET- Ukraine).  Furthermore, the regional 
training center prepares the contingent for peacekeeping. The INTERPEACENET- 
Ukraine is a non-governmental interdisciplinary research institution (on-line) which 
provides analytical and informational support to the highest bodies of executive and 
legislative power in Ukraine.  It covers a wide range of political, economic, legal, defense 
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and social issues related to national security in the strategic context. The 
INTERPEACENET-Ukraine (on-line) also coordinates research activities of research 
institutions and analytical centers devoted to national security and foreign policy. 100 
The main topics of research are:  
• national security 
• defense peacekeeping policy; 
• foreign peacekeeping policy and security 
• social and political development of Ukraine, Russia, other former Soviet 
republics 
• socio-economic strategies 
• regional affairs 
• environmental security 
• modeling and evaluation of the issues related to national security 
• development of informational internetworking technologies and 
informational environment analysis 
Forms of activities include:  
• conducting research 
• elaborating research-based recommendations and development strategies 
for INTERPEACENET 
• co-ordination of research activities of scientific institutions and research 
centers related to national security 
• organization and conduct of scientific conferences and seminars 
• publishing research papers and monographs 
• co-operation with international institutions and individual scholars 
• providing information services101  
INTERPEACENET-Ukraine conducts its various research activities in the form 
of projects. Analytical reports are published as research projects. Leading specialists from 
universities, analytical centers, and state bodies are invited to discuss these reports. 
Research coordination facilitates an exchange of information and joint meetings of the 




staff with researchers from other institutions. International conferences and seminars are 
also of great importance in research activity.102 
Ukraine gained useful information from joint peacekeeping exercises.  Many of 
the lessons learned from the first three joint exercises conducted in Autumn 1994 have 
been collated and were applied in the 1995 program, with the general objective of 
promoting enhanced interoperability amongst participating States. Eleven joint exercises 
were scheduled for 1995, including the first ever held in North America. 
A series of more than 40 workshops and seminars will prepare for these 
exercises and train Staff officers for their tasks in multinational 
Headquarters and formations. Cooperation and interoperability will be 
further enhanced through a wide range of bilateral and multilateral 
exercises hosted by individual Allies and Partners.103 
The Armed Forces branches closely coordinate their assignments with 
each other, engaging appropriate military arts and equipment. They also 
participate in law enforcement activities during emergencies, deal with 
consequences of natural and technological disasters, provide military 
assistance to other countries, engage in international military cooperation 
activities and international peacekeeping operations according to 
international agreements.104 
Former participants in peacekeeping operations and observer missions have 
described lessons learned and how those missions changed their outlook about civil-
military relations issues. Their statements represent reasons why the Ukrainian military 
should be committed to peacekeeping. 
They appreciate the value of peace from having served in a war-torn land.  The 
benefits include: 
• the opportunity to serve as a representative for their country, becoming 
key players in their country’s foreign affairs 
• the opportunity to mend and improve the military’s relationship to civilian 
authorities after returning from peacekeeping operations 
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• the necessity to learn to appreciate the importance of subordinating the 
military to civilian control; and the ability to foster cooperation with 
civilian institutions105 
F. INVESTMENT AND FINANCE COOPERATION FOR THE 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCES: IS IT 
FEASIBLE? 
It is difficult to discuss any kind of reform without better funding of the troops in 
general and the peacekeepers stationed in Ukraine in their pre-deployment period in 
particular.  “The military budget gives the implementation of military reform no chance; 
no reform [is feasible] without money; the MoD proceeds from the need to keep the 
potential we used to have, but the State is unable to maintain it,”—these strong 
statements were heard from some of the participants in the “Round table” discussion.’106 
"Power structures receive adequate resources to 



































Figure 4.   Reform of Functions of Power Structures.  
From: A. Gritsenko at al, Military Reform in Ukraine: Expert Opinion Poll, p. 32. 
By comparison, an example of Austria’s military budget of $1.2 million a year per 
unit of military hardware and its personnel; in Ukraine, on the contrary, the same aims 
are funded by only $31 thousand.107 However, if the same reduction rate is maintained or 
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about 40 thousand men a year, the goal of the MoD to have 150-170 thousand military 
and 50 thousand civilian personnel in 2005 is quite achievable.108 
Ideally, affluent states could initially sponsor the development of these regional 
peacekeeping forces and could provide funding, training, and logistic support, if 
necessary.  In the long run it would be more cost effective if peacekeeping operations 
were conducted by trained, professional peacekeeping forces familiar with the culture, 
societal differences and traditions of countries in specific regions.  
Strong financial backing, especially in the international arena, is necessary, if not 
vital, to the success of the program.  It is, for example, imperative to enhance skills in the 
seamless exchange of logistical support.  Among peacekeeping countries committed to 
one particular mission, soldiers have varying logistical mechanisms and use the 
equipment from their own countries, which often equates to incompatibility.  One option 
to minimize compatibility problems is to have one country provide all the equipment 
used by all members on a mission.  Although this option might require interoperability, 
proficiency, and specialized training by soldiers from other countries, training as “one” 
force unifies and creates cohesive units. 
There is already a lot of money spent on international-level programs, yet they are 
not completely successful.  Perhaps some funds from these programs could be diverted to 
modify peacekeeping training and support as proposed in this chapter.  For example, the 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program had a cumulative amount of $2.7 
billion in obligations at the end of FY2000.  It is a program which aims chiefly at 
assisting the de-nuclearization of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine.109  Another 
example of an existing program in which the U.S. provides funding to other countries is 
counter drug operations.  Billions of dollars for training, equipment, and logistics go to 
Colombia, and no one can measure whether this program is successful.  
It is necessary to find a defining goal for the future of the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces and for a stable, powerful, strong and democratic Ukraine.  First of all, national 
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defense is the primary defining goal of the UAF, while peacekeeping might be the 
second.  Improving and developing its participation in peacekeeping, the UAF should 
stand as a beacon for other countries that desire to contribute to regional security in a 
constructive manner.  
Ukraine remains committed to strengthening the leading role of the United 
Nations in maintenance of peace and security and enhancing its 
peacekeeping potential. In the year 2000 alone, fully recognizing its 
additional responsibility as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security 
Council, this country increased…its contribution in military and civilian 
personnel to the newly established or ongoing peacekeeping operations. 
As a matter of fact, there was no one such operation…without the 
contribution of Ukraine. Ukraine is determined to contribute further, by its 
practical deeds, to the… peacekeeping efforts.110 
Improvements in the educational system and training with an emphasis on 
psychological factors, better military-patriotic distinction, peacekeeping tactics and 
military police work should be undertaken in order to give an initial stage of 
understanding to the future young officers.  Such efforts are important in the development 
of the peacekeeping forces in the UAF.  Principles regarding the use of force and ROE 
constitute another point of concern for the training of peacekeepers. 
Given the example of the existing Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion as a 
possible model in terms of implementation, interoperability, and compatibility, the 
Ukrainian MoD might consider a creation of a dedicated PK unit.  Developing the 
structure of a unit within the UAF, this might be used as a model for a professionalized 
peacekeeping unit.  There are grounds to consider the creation of a national professional 
peacekeeping force.  This model could “spread” to other nations.  The involvement of 
nations within the region would improve the quality of each national armed force and at 
the same time would enhance regional stability and the international security 
environment.   
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V. A NEW MODEL FOR THE UKRAINIAN PEACEKEEPING 
FORCES: ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL 
Peacekeeping troops have been around for about fifty years under the auspices of 
the United Nations (U.N.).  However, there have been mixed results with successes and 
failures with peacekeeping around the world.  One factor that might cause peacekeeping 
missions to have mixed results is the use of unprofessional and poorly trained 
peacekeepers.  Part of this problem, with regards to unprofessional peacekeeping, has 
been low salaries.  These problems have contributed to the loss of the legitimacy and 
prestige of the U.N.  There is a perception about the U.N. that it does not have the 
reputation of being a viable organization to solve the problems of the world.  Therefore, 
strong organizations like NATO have had to take over unsuccessful missions started by 
the U.N.  Despite the mixed history of U.N.-led peacekeeping missions, peacekeeping is 
the answer in establishing peace and stability.  However, modifications have to be 
implemented to increase its success.  This chapter presents a “World Standard” as a 
model by which the quality of peacekeeping, and therefore, the success of those missions 
can be increased, which will also bring about peace and stability. 
Ukraine is a country that might benefit from joining peacekeeping operations with 
other countries as will be discussed in this chapter.  For example, Ukraine is a 
transitioning democracy and has many problems that could be partially alleviated by 
participation in peacekeeping.  Ukraine’s involvement in peacekeeping would show how 
it could improve its economic prosperity, social conditions, and help release ethnic 
tensions that currently exist in this country.   
As stated earlier, peacekeeping missions have not been successful due to the low 
quality of the soldiers committed to these operations.  This chapter addresses dynamics 
that might improve peacekeeping operations; particularly for those soldiers from Ukraine 
and other Eastern European countries who tend to be less professional and less 
disciplined.  Increasing the quality of these soldiers dedicated to peacekeeping might 
increase the benefits at the national, regional, and global arena in terms of security, 
stability and burden sharing.  
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A. CURRENT SITUATION 
Due in large part to the weak economies of Ukraine and many other countries, 
particularly in Eastern Europe, even including the new NATO members of Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Poland, low salaries are paid to soldiers and as a result do not attract 
educated, experienced, and self-disciplined recruits.  This causes these transitioning 
democracies to spend more money training these low quality soldiers in order to perform 
their missions at a higher standard.  Since peacekeeping training is more dynamic than 
normal combat training, it requires more training, and thus more money spent, and 
produces a highly trained soldier.  These soldiers are, therefore, worth more and receive 
higher salaries while peacekeeping and bring this money into the local economy to spend.  
In addition, these soldiers become a viable asset to the nation that can be dispatched to 
participate in more U.N. peacekeeping operations.  This, of course, means that the U.N. 
will spend more money on the nation producing the peacekeepers. 
In the case of Ukraine, Ukrainians join the military to participate in peacekeeping 
operations in order to make more than five times their normal military salary.  For 
instance, a Ukrainian captain normally makes about $120 US a month. If he participates 
in a peacekeeping operation, he would make around $700-800 US a month.  Upon 
returning to their country, some immediately leave military service since they are no 
longer earning the salary of a peacekeeper to the detriment of the state and the overall 
professionalism of the military.  The premise, then, is that if the average salaries of 
soldiers in Eastern European countries are increased, they will always have a deployable 
“quality” force for peacekeeping and defense.  It is well known that soldiers in other 
countries with higher military wages have the incentive to be more professional, 
motivated and disciplined. 
The current situation in peacekeeping is equivalent to security companies 
providing low quality security workers at airports in the U.S., since because they offer 
low wages, they only attract people with low education, training and motivation.  This 
practice has ultimately resulted in low quality security service and contributed to the 
disastrous consequences of the September 11th tragedy.  In a similar fashion, low salaries 
of soldiers in countries that provide peacekeepers result in poor quality of service as well.   
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The low quality of soldiers is just one part of the professionalization problems of 
peacekeeping.  Command and control difficulties arise in some instances during 
peacekeeping when there are clashes of culture between the military and the civilian 
leadership.  One of the problems in the civil-military relationship is that the military tends 
to be institutionally conservative while civil society is more liberal.  Many soldiers are 
uncomfortable working with or for civilians.  Moreover, the tour of duty for 
peacekeeping operations in the military is usually six months, while civilians usually 
serve for more than 12 months.  This causes a disparity and to some extent effects the 
success of the operation because soldiers need to gain more experience during the pre-
deployment training back in their countries.  It might cause additional tension between 
the civilians and the military in the mission.  In light of this, “What is a possible answer?” 
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Figure 5.   Organization of Peacekeeping Training in Ukraine. 
From: Ukrainian MoD, the Partnership for Peace and Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Center 
 
A possible answer is the world standard referred to earlier.  What is this world 
standard?  First, each participating country should establish a brigade of peacekeepers 
ready for deployment at all times.  Second, the peacekeeping unit should possess the 
following qualities: 1) The soldiers should be professionals and highly disciplined in their 
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field.  2) They must have strong financial backing from strong states to increase their 
ability of command, control, and logistic support.  3) Despite having their origins in 
different countries, they must be able to maneuver and operate as a single unit.  In order 
to achieve maneuverability and inter-operability, they must have similar unit 
characteristics. 
In addition, another vital point is the important role of civil-military relations.  
Without useful and effective relations between the military and civil authorities, 
involvement of the military in peacekeeping cannot be completed.  For instance, the 
country that contributes the peacekeepers must be overseen by its civilian authorities in 
order to legitimize their actions and input.  Moreover, since peacekeeping is implemented 
on the international scale, oversight by civilians is necessary in order to comply with 
international laws and regulations.  If the peacekeeping force demonstrates positive civil-
military relations during its duty in a given country, that obviously adds to the country’s 
prestige.   
How might participating countries tackle these requirements for successful 
peacekeeping?  The forthcoming proposal recommends the total professionalization of at 
least a brigade-size organization to peacekeeping. 
B. A PROPOSAL FOR PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 
1. The Brigade of Peacekeepers 
Each participating country should create at least a brigade of well-paid111, 
professionalized, and well-disciplined troops that are only dedicated to peacekeeping.  
They should always be ready to deploy at a moment’s notice not unlike the concept of the 
European Rapid Reaction Force envisioned by the European Union.  This should be the 
universal standard for peacekeeping operations. 
Operationally, each country should deploy one battalion of peacekeepers at a time 
and rotate them every six months so that there will always be high quality troops 
performing peacekeeping.  An incentive for the average soldier in the rest of the armed 
forces in these countries would be that they would want to motivate and discipline 
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themselves with the hopes of being selected for peacekeeping duties in the future.  The 
mere competition for such a well-paid and prestigious duty will help build professional 
services overall, including the reformation of the armed forces along democratic lines. 
2. Professionalism and Discipline 
From discussions with soldiers from advanced democracies such as the United 
States and other Western countries, it is clear that high salaries equate to higher 
motivation levels, better self-discipline and makes them more receptive to higher 
standards of training.  Higher motivation might encourage soldiers to perform better and 
be more loyal to their unit and country.  Soldiers who are more dedicated to their jobs and 
performance also help to increase morale.  Besides, higher motivation levels make 
soldiers want to accomplish their mission and follow the rules of engagement and the rule 
of the law.  Through such mechanisms, the quality of the soldier is improved and the 
mission gets accomplished in a more efficient, professional manner.  Therefore, higher 
salaries do a lot for attracting soldiers with higher education levels and retaining them for 
extended periods within the armed forces.  “The plan to reinforce U.N. regional 
peacekeeping with more money and more jobs is a good one but will only be effective if 
the peacekeeping forces themselves become more professional.”112  Thus, while the 
professionalization of peacekeepers is necessary, it cannot be realized not only without 
significant training on the part of the peacekeepers, but also from the countries that 
contribute the troops in terms of burden sharing. 
A professional and disciplined force committed to peacekeeping must always be 
ready and capable to participate in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
and humanitarian aid operations.  Arrangements must be made to provide training at the 
national level.  Taking advantage of on-the-job experience is very valuable.  The aim to 
further develop the unit should include the integration skills and knowledge acquired 
through training, previous experience (if such), and deployment.  The national defense 
structures must ensure full support of the units in terms of management, personnel, 
logistics, equipment, funding and the continuous improvement of its deployment 
capabilities. 
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Regarding peacekeeping, many mistakes are made by troops because officers and 
soldiers “were not accustomed to performing.”113  Even among NATO countries, it is 
noticeable that there is a need for extensive training in the pre-deployment period. 
Although contingents from NATO nations brought a high level of staff training 
and compatible procedures, and the officers of many nations proved to be highly 
professional, the significant disparity in training and doctrine among other participants 
made the planning process slower and more complicated than the situation required. First, 
planners had to determine what various contingents were capable of doing before 
assigning missions. Second, negotiations were conducted to determine what various 
contingents were willing to do based on guidance from their national capitals or the views 
of the contingent commanders.114 
To become more professional and better disciplined, there are several lessons 
learned from peacekeeping that individual soldiers can take home with them that 
ultimately benefits their country and society. Argentine general Carlos Maria Zabala 
made the following comments after having been a U.N. sector commander in Croatia. 
It provides first-hand knowledge of the effects of war, allowing our troops 
to appreciate the importance of the U.N. and its peace operations. On a 
personal level, it lends opportunity to travel to foreign locations and 
exposure to other cultures and customs. Additionally, it allows the troops 
to feel as representatives of their country in an important mission 
abroad.115  
What else must a peacekeeping soldier be responsive to if he is to be 
professional?  According to Morris Janowitz, the professional soldier must be responsive 
to civilian control because of military tradition and professionalism, the law, and because 
of his integration of acceptable norms and values supported by democratic society and 
institutions.116  Civilian leaders depend on military leaders because they recognize their 
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professional competence, and military leaders recognize the lawfully constituted civilian 
leadership in democracies.  Confidence and competence in each other is categorized by 
basic causal factors as values, issues, interests, personalities, and threats.117 
To further expound on this concept of civilian control over the military, it is 
important to understand that for any country, especially for those that are still 
transitioning to democracy, that they must have a professional military that willingly 
subordinates itself to civilian control.  An additional intangible and key benefit a military 
can learn from peacekeeping, and apply within its own country, is the opportunity to 
mend and nourish the relationship with their civilian authorities and society.  One 
participant of peacekeeping operations made the following observation.  “The military’s 
participation in peacekeeping allowed the armed forces to become a valuable player in 
the government’s foreign policy, bringing praise and recognition, where they had 
previously found disdain.”118  Furthermore, peacekeeping provides additional field 
training in leadership, tactics, and other functions within the framework that requires 
obedience to civilian authority.  For a country’s military, creating a positive relationship 
with civilian authorities and the society in which they live will generate civilian control 
and contribute to internal stability.  Thus, military participation in peacekeeping missions 
is “not only conducive to civilian authority, but actually enhances it.”119  
Learning to accept their role in society is another valuable lesson that troops can 
learn through participation in peacekeeping.  A deployment to another country allows the 
troops an opportunity to experience different cultures and customs, thereby increasing 
their understanding and tolerance of people from different parts of the world.  The travel 
itself to another country is beneficial to the military of any country, especially if they 
have never left their own soil.  They have the opportunity to make more friends and 
socialize with troops of different countries and cultures.  
Peacekeeping operations also provide soldiers with other unique and substantial 
opportunities.  For example, deploying to a real-world mission outside their country 
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allows them to hone military and/or diplomatic skills, provide field training for leaders, 
and apply tactics and other functions that enhance good order and discipline. 
3. Strong Financial Support 
Strong financial backing, especially from the international arena is necessary, if 
not vital, to the success of the program.  This is especially true when one wants to 
enhance skills in the seamless exchange of logistical support.  Among peacekeeping 
countries committed to one particular mission, soldiers have varying logistical 
mechanisms and use the equipment from other countries, which often leads to 
incompatibility and wasted assets.  One option to minimize compatibility problems is to 
have one country provide all of the equipment that is used by all members on a mission.  
Although this option might require operability, proficiency, and specialized training by 
soldiers from other countries; training as “one” force unifies and creates cohesive units. 
For the richer countries such as the G-7, there is a lot of money available to spend 
on international-level programs.  However, some of the money that is spent on these 
programs is not fully utilized or maximized for the greatest “bang for the buck.”  Perhaps 
some of the funds that are not efficiently maximized could be diverted to help 
professionalize peacekeeping as proposed in this chapter.  For example, the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program had a cumulative amount of $2.7 billion in 
obligations at the end of FY2000.  This program aims chiefly at assisting the de-
nuclearization of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine.120  While this program of 
de-nuclearization has been effective overall, much of the money that makes it to the 
countries listed often is misspent or is misappropriated.  Finding the money that is 
misspent and utilizing it for the professionalization of peacekeeping would be a more 
efficient use of the money.  Another example is the US program called “Plan Colombia,” 
one of several counter drug programs where the U.S. provides funding to other countries.  
Billions of dollars for training, equipment, and logistics go to Colombia, but little 
measured progress has been made with this program.  
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 4. Combined Training 
The prescription of interoperability and ability to operate as a single unit alluded 
to earlier in the chapter, must be stressed for competent and successful peacekeeping 
operations.  Despite having their origins in different countries, committed peacekeeping 
troops must be able to maneuver and operate as a single unit.  To achieve 
maneuverability and inter-operability, they must have similar unit characteristics.  As 
discussed previously, good salaries, discipline, and motivation will increase the quality of 
soldiers as the foundation from which to build on.  Then, what is required are similar 
tactics and training in police functions and human sensitivities in order to effectively 
accomplish their jobs, which reduces human rights violations, an effect that would 
accomplish the U.N. mission.   
A similar example of what is referred to here, but not quite, is the multinational 
peacekeeping units such as the Baltic battalion.  This battalion is made of Lithuanian, 
Latvian and Estonian peacekeepers.  They demonstrate an excellent example of good 
cooperation in which a common language (English) and common procedures (NATO 
SOPs) are used on a daily basis.  These characteristics offer the inter-operability needed 
for effective peacekeeping.  Another example of inter-operability and unification of a 
diverse group into one mission is the joint Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion.  
In order to properly carry out peacekeeping operations, certain conditions should 
be met.  These include pre-mission preparation, familiarity with doctrine and procedures 
used in the mission, and commanders accepting responsibility and exercising initiative 
when dealing with the local authorities.  Units must be stable under stress, able to make 
decisions, cooperative on a tactical level, reliable and determined.  These attributes are 
essential in a multinational environment.  Also important is the formation of a liaison and 
advisory team from the host unit.  This helps to facilitate successful integration with the 
NGO’s working in the area.  In addition, a standard language must be used for 
communicating.  Both the U.N. and NATO use the English language for peacekeeping 
operations.  Therefore, English-language skills are needed at all levels and commanders 
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must be provided with continuous and feedback-enabling implementation of lessons 
learned. 
It is important to note that before a country can participate in peacekeeping 
operations, their soldiers must be first subjected to a specific type of training.  As 
previously mentioned, the focus of training for peacekeeping is found in police functions 
and human rights, characterized by the psychology and sociology of crisis intervention.  
Some of the training also includes the use of escalation and de-escalation of aggression 
based on the situation and rules of engagement about the conditions of use of force and 
deadly force.  Since peacekeeping may include implied tasks such as searching 
individuals and temporary seizure of personal belongings, training in police functions is 
essential to peacekeeping.  Also, since other functions may include security and 
patrolling streets, training in detention and the arrest of individuals is also very important 
for a mission to be successful.  
Carrying out an arrest is the point where an untrained peacekeeper may begin to 
excessive or deadly force, which can quickly lead to negative political and diplomatic 
consequences.  Therefore, training in police functions and human relations as 
peacekeepers for the military of any country would stand as an excellent force multiplier.  
However, the tangibles in revenues, travel, and training opportunities from peacekeeping 
are just one side of the spectrum of benefits. 
C. BENEFITS FOR PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES 
Many tangible and intangible benefits can be derived from participating in 
peacekeeping operations around the world.  For some countries, tangible benefits include 
monetary compensation for salaries and equipment use, and for others, it serves as a form 
of real income and other material gains.  
For example, consolidating a democracy might promote foreign investment by 
multi-national corporations (MNCs) and produce opportunities to increase economic 
growth.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (N.A.F.T.A.) is just one example in 
which foreign investment proved beneficial.  However, to take advantage of such 
opportunities, a country must prove to be stable internally.  Peacekeeping operations are 
just one more step they can take towards democratization and increasing economic gains 
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through foreign investments.  Participation in peacekeeping by increasing economic 
cooperation might decrease insurgency, nationalistic struggle and other disorders.  
Protecting innocent lives is another way for participating countries to enhance 
their own profile domestically and internationally.  For example, U.N. forces have 
cleared mine fields in Kuwait, enforced U.N. mandates in Cyprus, and operated a hospital 
in Mozambique.121    
Peacekeeping offers military forces intangible benefits such as the opportunity to 
improve their image and prestige at home and abroad.122  For example, peacekeeping 
forces around the world are directly involved in bringing peace and stability to warring 
nations, an honorable and prestigious duty worthy of emulation by all the countries in the 
world.  Alternatively, soldiers learn restraint first hand by coping with different situations 
without having to shoot first and ask questions later. 
Additionally, other important elements of military professionalism are military 
expertise, service responsibility, corporateness, and the civilian application of “objective 
control” over the military. This means that the civilian authorities grant the military 
autonomy within its area of expertise and the military agrees to respect civilian 
authority.123  Therefore, the concept of mutual trust and respect between militaries and 
civilians can be put into practice during the participation of the military in peacekeeping.  
1. Benefits and Concerns at the National and International Level 
By encouraging neighboring countries to participate in joint exercises while 
practicing the proposed model described above, countries can establish their own mutual 
programs to enhance peaceful co-existence.  In addition, they can improve the social, 
economic and political situation in their regions.  Internal stability and peace in any 
country, as insured by a democratic process, can also bring other tangible and intangible 
benefits.  
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Fulfilling this regional commitment is very resource consuming. It generates a 
heavy burden for countries in a regional block that want to contribute peacekeeping 
forces but do not yet have the resources to pay, train, and equip professional 
peacekeeping soldiers.  Therefore, it is important to examine the costs and benefits for 
future participation in peacekeeping for those states that are willing to share the burden.  
For those countries that cannot pay for themselves, it is necessary to create a special fund 
to motivate them to participate in peacekeeping.  Nations contributing to the special fund 
must recognize that it is much cheaper to support regional units financially and 
logistically than to absorb the cost of long-term peacekeeping operations resulting from 
inexperienced, uncommitted U.N. troops. 
In peacekeeping operations, a concern voiced by countries such as the U.S. and 
Britain is that their troops must not operate under the command of a foreign officer.  This 
is seen as a violation of their sovereignty.  However, because of the success of NATO in 
Bosnia, countries should be more comfortable in contributing peacekeeping troops under 
the operational command of NATO for the purpose of implementing U.N. peacekeeping 
missions.  In addition, the U.N. can learn from NATO how to overcome its lack of 
consultation with military practitioners.  On other hand, NATO might recognize the need 
for greater coordination with civilian actors on an operational level.  
Increasingly, crisis response operations bring together more and more countries, 
working together.  “Multinationality is often considered both a military and a political 
necessity, militarily because resources can be combined and specialized skills utilized, 
and politically because it gives greater legitimacy to the operation.”124 
There is also a need to develop and sustain consensus within the international 
community over the political, humanitarian and military objectives of missions.  This 
point is particularly important for troop providing countries.  For example, the situation 
in former Yugoslavia proves that when a mission becomes progressively more difficult, 
respective governments increase their obligations and requirements for national 
contingents, rather than by the U.N. chain of command. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Participating in peacekeeping missions around the world is an honorable 
profession because it is an expression of goodwill for the world.  Leaders of the countries 
that are members of different international organizations, and the U.N. in particular, must 
openly examine ways to deal with future regional wars.   
Efforts must be carefully waged to maintain robust civil-military relations in 
country participants, particularly for peacekeeping, since it deals with military might.  As 
an analyst from the U.S. Army War College pointed out, “while military power is 
essential, it is not sufficient. Indeed, militarizing the effort may be a good indicator of 
continued failure” during democratic transitions and consolidations in a country. 
Admittedly, the most promising alternative to direct U.N. involvement is the 
employment of regional forces that are well prepared, compatible in training and 
logistics, and well funded.  Three steps need to be considered:  
• Increase the strength and responsibilities of regional power blocs.  This 
would include developing regional peacekeeping forces that are trained 
professionals in peacekeeping operations.  
• Strong states initially sponsor the development of these regional 
peacekeeping forces for funding, training, and logistic support where 
necessary 
• The U.N. should encourage the strengthening of regional powers.  
Regional conflicts will be solved only when regional powers stop 
expecting America or NATO to intervene. Regional powers must be 
allowed to mature. 125 
Peacekeeping operations cover the broad spectrum of actions intended to forestall, 
diminish, or end outbreaks of violence on the international scene.  They “encompass six 
more or less distinct types of civilian, civil-military or just plain military programs 
designed essentially to give peace a chance in varying circumstances of violence across 
the broad front of conflict resolution.”126  It is important for the state to participate in 
such missions in order to obtain the credibility for its armed forces. It has an impact on 
democratic civil-military relations because a country has to make certain decisions and 
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put into practice certain regulations in order to participate in such a mission.  That of 
course requires that a new law be passed in a parliament if one has not yet been created in 
order to send troops abroad.  This is especially important for countries during the process 
of consolidating democracy because it gives inputs and stimulates discussion on the 
military.  In addition, those officers who take part in peacekeeping missions and work in 
civil-military relations obtain the knowledge and experience which allows them to use it 
back in their country.  
In general, the success of peacekeeping operations is difficult to evaluate because 
the objective or mandate of each mission differs.  This fact is important to consider for 
the planning and implementation of a peacekeeping mission. 
Paul Diehl of the University of Illinois suggests, however, two basic criteria for 
evaluating traditional peacekeeping operations that can be applied in partial evaluation of 
more complex missions as well: how well an operation deterred or prevented violent 
conflict in its area of deployment; and how much it facilitated “resolution of the 
disagreements underlying the conflict.”  These are useful and seemingly straightforward 
criteria, yet surprisingly difficult to apply in practice even to traditional operations, 
because what host and troop are contributing. Also, what members of the Security 
Council want from peacekeeping operations varies from state to state and from mission to 
mission.127 
Equally important, since militaries might use limited force, which “in [the] 
context of peace operations is very different from the massive use of force,”128 this point 
must be considered by both civilians and militaries. 
Politicians, journalists and the general public are confused.  For most of them 
using force is synonymous with going to war and taking sides in a given conflict.  The 
military still struggle with the question of how to use force without getting into a 
dangerous process of escalation and destroying the entire peace process. In Somalia, the 
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confusion about the proper use of force amongst the military and politicians has led to 
tragic events and a rushed withdrawal.129 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Leaders of the countries that are members of the U.N. must publicly examine 
ways to deal with future regional wars.  The most promising alternative to direct U.N. 
involvement is the employment of regional forces.  Three steps need to be considered:  
• Increase the strength and responsibilities of regional power blocs.  This 
would include developing regional peacekeeping forces that are trained 
professionals in peacekeeping operations.  “Common Market countries 
would take primary responsibility for actions in Europe, such as in 
Yugoslavia, and the Organization for African Unity or the Arab League 
would do the same in places like Somalia.”130  
• Strong states that are U.N. members initially sponsor the development of 
these regional peacekeeping forces, and funding, training, and logistic 
support if necessary.  In the long run, the peacekeeping forces will be 
more cost effective for the U.N. if peacekeeping operations are conducted 
by trained, professional peacekeeping forces familiar with the culture, 
societal differences, and traditions of a country in the certain region.  The 
alternative would force too great a burden onto strong states or entrust the 
U.N. with responsibilities it cannot fulfill.   
• The U.N. should encourage the strengthening of regional powers.  
Regional conflicts will be solved only when regional powers stop 
expecting strong states to intervene.  Regional powers must be allowed to 
mature. 
Using the examples of existing multinational peacekeeping units, such as the 
Baltic battalion and the Ukrainian-Polish battalion, can help to develop different 
approaches to the professionalization of peacekeeping forces.  The involvement of 
nations within the region will improve the quality of each national armed force and at the 
same time will enhance regional stability and the international security environment.  
Sharing the burden of the common goal or to keep peace and stability in the world, will 
be, and must be, implemented by other nations, not only by the great powers. 
The task of making regional peacekeeping units would not be easy though.  
Fulfilling this regional commitment is very resource consuming.  It generates a heavy 
burden for countries in a regional block that want to contribute peacekeeping forces but 
do not yet have the resources to pay, train, and equip professional peacekeeping soldiers.  
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Therefore, it is important to examine the costs and benefits for the future participation in 
peacekeeping of those states that are willing to share the burden.  For those countries that 
cannot pay for themselves, it is necessary to create a special fund to motivate them to 
participate in peacekeeping.  Nations contributing to the special fund must recognize that 
it is much cheaper to support regional units financially and logistically than to acquire the 
cost of long-term peacekeeping operations resulting from inexperienced, uncommitted 
U.N. troops. 
The requirements for these units are readiness, high performance, and capability 
to participate in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian 
aid operations.  Arrangements must be made to provide training on the national level.  
The opportunity to pursue on-the-job experience is very valuable.  The aim of further 
development of the unit should be to further integrate the skills and knowledge acquired 
through training, previous experience (if any), and deployment into the national defense 
structures, ensure full support of the units in terms of management, personnel, logistics, 
equipment and funding, and enhance its deployment capabilities.  
The plan to reinforce U.N. regional peacekeeping with more money and 
more jobs is a good one but will only be effective if the peacekeeping 
forces themselves become more professional.  If by their inherent nature 
peacekeeping forces cannot keep peace, then pumping in more funds and 
personnel will not make a qualitative difference.131 
The United States is one of the strong states in the world whose support is 
absolutely necessary for this concept of strengthening regional peacekeeping forces.  
However, the question of whether the U.S. is willing to support this concept, especially as 
it is seen in its national interest, is far from clear.  For example, is the U.S. Congress 
likely to support proposals for regional peacekeeping units? When the Senate has 
discussed similar issues, such as a request to fund an operation in Kosovo, most senators 
expressed the view that other countries must contribute more in sharing the peacekeeping 
burden.  The House, by a vote of 264 to 153, adopted an Amendment sponsored by 
Congressmen Christopher Shays and John Kasich (R-Ohio) to the 2001 Defense 
Authorization hill (HR 4205).  The Amendment would require the link of funding for and 
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participation in Kosovo operations to European funding and participation to the U.S. 
armed forces’ involvement.   
The evidence signals significant support in the U.S. Congress for burden-sharing.  
The question for the Congress is whether the American people will support the idea of 
creating new peacekeeping forces on a regional basis or not.  Congress recognizes that 
the public is increasingly unwilling to send or involve U.S. troops in the peacekeeping 
process, especially after operations in Somalia and the “CNN” impact on the American 
public.  If the regional peacekeeping forces are seen as increasingly burden-sharing and 
an improvement of regional security and stability, while lessening the need for U.S. troop 
contributions, it might receive Congressional support.   
The National Defense Authorization Act, the House of Representatives 
approved the amendment sponsored by Congressman Christopher Shays 
designed to encourage our European allies to pay their share of the costs 
of the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.  Shays cosponsored the 
amendment with Reps. John Kasich (R-OH), Gary Condit (D-CA), Barney 
Frank (D-MA), Spencer Bachus (R-AL), and Peter DeFazio (D-OR).  
We need to begin to make the tough decisions on defense if we are going 
to bring our military into the post-Cold War world of the 21st century”, 
Shays said.  "Our fighters flew 70 percent of the sorties over Kosovo.  Our 
military took the greatest risk; we've fulfilled our financial obligations.  
Our allies, unfortunately, have not.  If we do not require them to shoulder 
their fair share of the operational costs, more of our budget surpluses and 
limited military resources could be eaten up by this open-ended military 
commitment.   
The amendment requires that the next president certify our European allies 
have made a down payment on their financial and personnel commitments 
by April 1, 2001.  If not, it prohibits Department of Defense funding from 
being expended for the continued deployment of U.S. ground combat 
forces in Kosovo.   
The amendment is similar to one that was rejected by the House during 
debate on the emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act in March of 
this year [2000].  The proposal was modified to address members' 
concerns.  Specifically, the previous amendment mandated a stop to 
funding for Kosovo operations pending certification our allies are 
fulfilling their obligations.  The amendment also adds 10 months to the 
certification time, from June 1, 2000 to April 1, 2001.  To address 
concerns raised on the floor during the debate in March, the amendment 
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provides authority for a 180-day Presidential waiver for purposes of 
national security.  The requirement for withdrawal applies only to ground 
troops, not to all military personnel, as was previously required.132 
There are other documents confirming U.S. willingness and strong desire to 
support the idea of involvement of other countries in analogical issues.  An example is 
the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.  It has a “cumulative total of 
$2.7 billion in obligations to the end of FY2000 and is a defense program aimed chiefly 
at assisting the denuclearization of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine, where 
nuclear weapons were located when the Soviet Union fell.”133  The U.S. also provides 
money for training, equipment, and logistics for counter-narcotics policy and counter-
drug forces in Colombia.   
The creation of professional peacekeeping forces at the national level among 
regional powers therefore is necessary to develop and support struggling democratic 
states, particularly during their transitioning period.  The more nations that are involved 
in the peacekeeping process, the stronger the international security environment and 
regional stability will be globally.  
The establishment of a brigade of well paid, highly trained, and motivated troops 
in participating countries (that can deploy at a moment’s notice) will surely increase the 
success of peacekeeping as a whole.  The use of peacekeeping troops modeled along 
democratic lines will usher in peace and stability in those countries.  Mature, democratic 
countries have already learned the value of paying their soldiers well in return for high 
quality of service and commitment.  Since Eastern European countries have not yet 
achieved an adequate level of economic development to do the same, they suffer the 
consequences of the low quality of soldiering.  As a remedy, financially sound countries 
that already spend billions in other international programs should divert some of the 
funding to peacekeeping for the creation of such brigades.  The brigades should be 
trained and supplied as a universal unit so that they will have the capabilities to be fully 
compatible with each other, and supportive of each other using similar tools and supplies. 
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133 Curt Tarnoff, The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance, on Congressional Research 
Service (CRS), March 7, 2001. 
The necessity to create another kind of peacekeeping unit is evident.  The more 
nations are involved in the peacekeeping process, the stronger the international security 
environment and regional stability will be in a certain region.  Participating in 
peacekeeping can demonstrate the commitment of a country to the democratic process, 
internal and external stability, and mutual trust in civil-military affairs.  Therefore, in 
order to earn respect at home and abroad, the military should apply their civil skills in 
other countries.  In this case, other countries can learn from the military forces’ technical 
expertise in civil affairs mission, not to mention counter insurgency.  Military 
involvement in domestic affairs, on the other hand, should only be reserved for regional 
or national emergencies.   
Peacekeeping and security that result from it has been shown to quicken the pace 
towards democratization and civilian control of the military, elements that foreign 
investors like multi-national corporations look for before investing in a country.  
According to Emmanuel Kant, in the world arena, a democratic country is one that is 
internally stable, can settle internal problems peacefully, and most likely will not declare 
war against another democracy.  A democratic country also shows a high level of 
maturity in which other countries can feel they can disagree with, without fearing some 
sort of retaliation.    
Professional peacekeeping must be implemented for higher rates of success and 
for the improvement of individual nation prestige in the international arena.  While only 
one solution to the problem of failed peacekeeping missions in the past, the 
professionalization of peacekeepers is an important first step.  What is needed for the 
initial funding and support for this proposal are strong, prosperous states.  With this 
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APPENDIX A.  MILITARY STRUCTURE OF UKRAINIAN ARMED 
FORCES 
Military Structure of Ukraine
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APPENDIX B.  PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF UKRAINIAN 
PEACEKEEPING BRIGADE 
 
Proposed Structure of UA PK BDE
PK Bde HQ

























Peace Enforcement Requirements 
*Brigade is self-sufficient, does not require support from Land Forces on a regular basis. 
*Each Infantry Peacekeeping Battalion should have 1 transportation platoon of 6 trucks 
for 
humanitarian needs. 
*Engineer Battalion should have: -Bridge Company; -Mine Detection Company; -Road 
Construction Co. 
*Helicopter squadron must consist of 8X  MI-8 and 4X MI-24. 
 
Non-combat Requirements 
*If GS allows, Liaison/Oversight Group should consist of NATO/UN/OSCE 
representatives. 
*Troops in Brigade should be flexible in peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace 
maintenance missions. 
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APPENDIX C.  PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF A PEACEKEEPING 
BATTALION 
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